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The Role and Structure of Civil Society Organizations in National and Global Governance

Evolution and outlook between now and 2030

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(Fifth draft June 2012)

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Abstract

The last decade has witnessed a tremendous growth of non-governmental actors, such as NGOs or labor unions, commonly referred to as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). This has followed the trend of the globalization of social, economical and environmental issues which are less and less limited to a specific country or field. The purpose of this paper is to draw a global picture of the weight and influence of CSOs at a national and global level and then to make assumptions of their future evolution until 2030 through a set of four scenarios.

In a first part, we thus define three main criteria to evaluate CSOs' power: the capacity, the sustainability and the impact of CSOs. Thanks to these criteria, we try to compare the weight and structure of the civil society sector by country: we study their human resources (both paid staff and volunteers), their sources of revenue and their distribution amongst fields of intervention. This allows us to regroup countries in five country clusters which correspond to a specific typology of the development of the civil society sector: the Liberal (Anglo-Saxon) model, the Welfare Partnership (Western European and Mediterranean) model, the Social Democratic (Nordic) model, the Deferred Democratization (Latin American, Eastern and Central European, Industrialized Asian) model and the traditional (African and Indian) model.

In the second part of this paper, we study the power and structure of CSOs at a global level. We analyze the frame of intervention of CSOs and their relationship with major international institutions: the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization (as well as transnational corporations). For each organization, we characterize the main trends which have marked the evolution of their relationship with CSOs, especially since the 2000s and the break-up of the Washington Consensus, in order to be able to make assumptions regarding the future.

We conclude this paper with a prospective view of CSOs through a set of four macro-economic and financial scenarios of the AUGUR project: Reduced Government, China and US intervention, Regionalisation and Multipolar Collaboration. For each scenario we try to characterize the main trends of the power and structure of CSOs by 2030, both at a regional and global level, especially regarding the evolution of the regional typologies identified in our first part and the impact of financial and environmental CSOs regarding global environmental issues and financial regulation.

\[1\text{ http://www.augurproject.eu/}\]
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I. Introduction and definition of civil society organizations

Together with states, international institutions and firms, civil society organizations (CSOs) constitute the fourth type of regulation agent identified in the AUGUR project (Petit, 2012). CSOs basically arise from failures of national States (and international institutions) and markets. Historically, the State has been seen as the main actor dealing with market failures and negative externalities. However, because of political and administrative constraints, States are often not able to cover the full range of needs of the citizens resulting from these market failures, especially since the demand is believed to be heterogeneous and the State is especially efficient in providing homogeneous goods and services (thanks to economies of scales) but it is much less efficient in providing heterogeneous goods and services (Johnson & Prakash, 2007). CSOs are thus created by the citizens to fill the gap left by markets and States. There is thus a long tradition of local civil society activism (more or less formal, more or less linked with religious organizations depending on the country or region). However, the last two decades represent a shift in the evolution of CSOs: thanks to the development of new communication technologies, especially the internet, CSOs have become more and more global and have become a new regulation agent both at a national (or regional) and global levels.

The civil society sector has been growing at a rapid rate in several countries in the last two decades (Salamon et al., 1995-2010). According to an empirical study led by the John Hopkins University, it is now a major economical force, employing on average about 5.6% of the economically active population in 2005 (this figure can reach up to more than 10% in several developed countries). This represents nearly 56 million full time equivalent (FTE) workers, including both paid workers (58% of total FTE) and volunteers (42% of total FTE) which makes it one of the major sectors of the economy in terms of employment (see fig. 1.1 below). Since volunteers often work less than paid staff, the actual number of volunteers exceeds the latter and was estimated around 132 million people in 2000 which represented almost 10% of the adult population of the 36 countries included in the study. All in all, if civil society’s expenditures would have been compared with countries’ GDP, it would have made it the 6th largest economy in 2005 (Salamon, 2010). CSOs thus play a growing role in economical, social and environmental issues and have an increasing influence on global governance issues.

First, CSOs act at a local and national level. They provide a certain amount of services to the population, public authorities and even businesses. In several countries, they play a key role in the fulfillment of social, cultural and welfare services, be it as a separate self financed organization or in cooperation with national governments and local public authorities. They are thus involved in public missions and public services which are facing new challenges and may experience tremendous changes in the future (Bance, 2012). Besides, they play a political and civic role by bringing social, civic and environmental issues to the agenda and by influencing governments’ and firms’ policies. As governments and public authorities are seeking legitimacy, try to understand the needs of the population and attempt to fulfill their regulatory and welfare missions in the best possible way, CSOs are the indispensable link between people and public authorities. CSOs will most likely be involved in the major social, political, economical and environmental issues which will be faced in the future. Depending on the field, CSOs will have a more or less important impact and role to play. In the civic and human rights fields for instance, CSOs are seen as a natural contributor to democratization and the defense of vulnerable populations as they are the manifestation of a spontaneous form of civic and democratic action, especially in countries where public authorities lack of democracy. CSOs will
most certainly play a major role in the democratization of national societies, in the spread of basic human rights and in the setting of basic labor rights through law or norms. CSOs are also involved in well-being issues (education, health, social services, culture, recreation etc.) as they provide such services, independently or in cooperation with public authorities. As these well-being sectors are facing radical transformation (privatization of the education system, development of health insurance in the USA and China, reformation of pension schemes etc.) CSOs will be in the center of the debates. In some cases, they might replace the state where the latter will withdraw. In other cases, it might cooperate with public authorities to elaborate and implement the best reformations of public welfare services which will be needed to accompany social transformations. Moreover, as governments will face major environmental issues at a national level, due to natural disaster resulting from climate change or radical land re-settlement and housing issues for the sake of energy efficiency, they will have to cooperate with CSOs in order to legitimize their policies and to elaborate efficient and coherent solutions. The implication, the impact and the deployment of CSOs’ actions will be of course very different from one country (or region) to another, because of national or regional cultural patterns, social structure or level of development.

The major issue here is thus to understand how and in which cultural, economical and institutional context the civil society sector has developed in the different countries and what are the perspective of evolution of CSOs in each country or region. The major questions regarding CSOs at a national level in the future are their ability to extend and sustain their financial and human resources, to cooperate with states without losing their independence and to develop emergent sectors of the civil society such as finance or environment.

But this national influence of CSOs can be extended at a global level. Global governance can no longer be exclusively in the hand of governments and international institutions. This is reflected by the increasing place of CSOs at an international level both independently and in cooperation with international institutions such as the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank and, to a lesser extent, the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. International institutions, which are in need of legitimization because of their lack of democratic structure and which lack the competence and resources to conduct field studies and project implementations incorporate more and more CSOs within their policy making process.

Again, the relation between CSOs and international institution depends heavily on the latter and of the field of intervention concerned. In the field of human, labor and farmer rights, CSOs will certainly play an important role regarding international norm setting and the democratization of international institutions which may lead to the emergence of a global democracy (D’Orfeuil, 2006). Major technological issues, which involve societal and ethical aspects which are too important to be decided only amongst technical experts (such as nuclear technologies, biotechnologies, nanotechnologies etc.) will be publicly discussed. In this context, CSOs will have a major role to play, as a provider of independent expertise, rallying organizations of public concerns, advocacy counter-powers of firm lobbies etc. Firms as well, especially transnational companies (TNCs) will be more and more under the pressure of environmental CSOs as an ecological sensibility will gain power within the society. New communication technologies will allow constant watch by CSOs over bad practices which will force TNCs to adopt new behaviors. Moreover, after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, a new field of intervention of CSOs is emerging, aiming to advocate for a better and fairer global financial regulation. The question here is whether financial CSOs will gain a sufficient weight and power to influence global financial regulatory institutions (G20, IMF ...). Regarding global
development and poverty fighting, the role of CSOs will also certainly be very important as they are part of the global development strategy of the United Nations and the World Bank through the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).

In the first part of this paper we will thus identify the main fields where CSOs intervene at a national level and characterize the different national or regional existing typologies. We will evaluate the weight, the capacity (resources), the sustainability, the impact and the distribution of CSOs by field of intervention in each group of countries. Then we will extend our analysis to the global level. We will study how, in which field and in which context national civil society movements can be extended to an international level. We will identify which types of CSOs are acting at a global level and how they interfere with the different international institutions and TNCs. To finish, based on the conclusion of our retrospective analysis and of the drivers of the capacity, sustainability and impact of CSOs both at national and international levels identified in the first two part of this paper, we will try to understand the future trends of CSOs’ actions through a set of scenarios.

Figure 1.1: Civil Society Workforce vs Major Industries, 41 countries, ca. 2005

A. Definition of Civil society organizations

In this paper we use the definition of civil society proposed by Salamon et al. (2004) which characterizes CSOs with five criteria: CSOs are private, non profit distributing, self-governing, voluntary organizations. This definition is of course questionable as some organizations may be borderline cases regarding these criteria. However we argue that in most of the cases CSOs can be easily distinguished from states, international institutions and firms thanks to these criteria.

Organizations: it means that they have some structure or regularity. Whether they are formally and legally registered or not is not important but they do have some permanent activity through regular meetings, membership or some organizational frame.

Private: this signifies that they are institutionally separate from the state, even if they can receive consequent amount from the state.
**Not profit distributing:** this means that their purpose is not primarily commercial and they do not distribute profit to specific people (shareholders, a set of directors etc.). This means that if they make some profit, they reinvest it or use it to fulfill their mission.

**Self-governing:** this means that they are independent from both firms and governments, which means that there are in control of their own affairs.

**Voluntary:** this means that no one is obliged to join or become member of these organizations. Membership is the result of a free choice which means that these organizations are at least partially based on voluntary actions.

**Nb:** there is still a debate among scholars if businesses lobbying groups and business & industry NGOs (BINGOs) should be included within the definition of civil society. Strictly speaking, we define civil society as separated from both states and markets and thus exclude business oriented CSOs from our strict definition of civil society, considering that these groups are extensions of firms, such as some sort of special departments. However, as these organizations exist and are often treated as regular CSOs (especially regarding their relationships with international institutions) we have to take them into account in our study.

### B. Types of CSOs

CSOs are very diverse and can take various shapes. We distinguish five main types of CSOs (religious, community based, philanthropic, expert groups and trade unions), plus two types of hybrid organizations (business CSOs and government oriented CSOs). This classification is not exclusive. It is only meant to clarify our purpose.

The first type of CSOs are religious CSOs. These CSOs do not necessarily promote the worship of a given religion and most of the time their primary objective is not the promotion of the latter. However they are more or less linked to a given religion and act following a religious precept (ex: Christian charity). Their primary fields of intervention are education, health, emergency relief and basic assistance (food, clothing, shelter etc.). The Red Cross is a famous example of such CSOs.

The second type of CSOs are community based CSOs. These are most of the time local CSOs based on solidarity, resource sharing and community building. Their primary fields of intervention are development (ex: the Grameen Bank), housing, social services (such as child welfare, family services, youth welfare, services for the elderly and other personal social services), civic and legal assistance but also culture and recreation CSOs.

The third type of CSOs are philanthropic CSOs. These organizations serve a cause without any religious affiliation and are based on values such as generosity and humanism. They include private and business foundations (ex: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) but also independent NGOs such as Doctors Without Border (DWB) or Amnesty International.

The forth type of CSOs are expert CSOs. These CSOs act in the “new fields” which require at least some scientific knowledge, i.e. environment and finance. These CSOs are not exclusively composed of experts and scientists but they have – or at least they claim to have – an expertise unit and publish some technical reports. Greenpeace International or ATTAC are examples of such CSOs.

The last type of CSOs are trade unions, which are labor and worker associations which promote their interests.
In addition, we distinguish two types of hybrid organizations, which are, in a way, civil organizations, but which are not completely separated from States or firms. Government oriented NGOs (GONGOs) are independent civil organizations which are more or less influenced and controlled by national authorities. These organizations are especially developed in industrialized Asian countries, particularly in China, following the tradition of a strong bureaucratic central State. Business & Industry NGOs (BINGOs) are civil organizations which defend a given firm’s or industry’s interests, or at least which are very influenced by the latter. These organizations are especially developed in Anglo-Saxon countries, particularly the USA, following the tradition of a liberal capitalist oriented society.

C. Types of actions: service provision and advocacy

In this paper we distinguish two main categories for CSOs’ work. Most of the CSOs are hybrid as they are active in these two categories. However most of the time it is possible to associate a CSO with its major type of work.

The first one is advocacy. It is a rather top-down approach which consists in influencing authorities and impacting their policy making process by expressing cultural, spiritual, political, social, environmental and ethnical concerns (Salamon et al., 2004). Advocacy can take the form of counter-power actions and protests. This includes notably bringing issues to the agenda through awareness campaigns and “name and shame” strategies. But it can also be a cooperation between CSOs and authorities as the latter consult civil society and incorporate its propositions in its policy making process. This top-down approach is mainly used when CSOs act at a global level (by impacting international institutions and TNCs) and at a national level (by influencing governments). But in some cases it can also be local actions sometimes called “community building” activities, especially in the culture and recreation sector. The current trend of advocacy CSOs is to try to define their objectives beyond specific advocacy goals. Most of advocacy CSOs define their ultimate goal around the concept of democracy building, which mainly consists in giving voice to the people and create a citizen’s governance.

The second type of CSOs’ work is service provision. It is a rather bottom-up approach which consists in acting as a socio-economical agent by providing concrete services to the population, businesses or governments and international institutions. This includes in particular welfare services to the population (education, recreation, health, family etc.), humanitarian support, development project implementation and advice & expertise services to businesses, governments and international institutions. This bottom-up approach is essentially local and very concrete. However service provision it is not only restricted to the local level and can sometimes scale up to a more global level. This is for instance the case when CSOs bring local concerns to the global agenda and discuss these issues with global actors when providing advice services to them, or when niche expert groups provide their expertise and spread technical or social innovation within public authorities and/or TNCs. In these cases service provision becomes very close to advocacy and the bottom-up-top-down loop becomes complete as grassroots issues are incorporated within global bodies (bottom-up) which eventually implement top-down policies.

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2 This concept will be discussed more in detail later in this paper.
Again, the current trend is to define objectives beyond concrete service provision goals. Most of service provision CSOs define themselves as capability builder. This means that they seek not only to provide concrete services to the population but that they try to think in the long term by providing capability so that people will be able to choose and take care of their own future themselves.

D. CSOs and Welfare State: complementarity and substitution

Since CSOs arise from failures of national States (and international institutions) and markets, one could ask if CSOs are simply a substitute to States which have failed their mission (thus assuming that CSOs are only a temporary solution and would disappear if the State is reformed and reassumes its missions) or if they are rather responding to a structural need of the society by helping States, international institutions and even companies to fulfill their social and environmental missions.

Empirical studies show that there is at least no negative correlation between the importance of the welfare State and the development of CSOs (Salamon et al, 2010). Indeed, the countries where CSOs are the most developed (Western and North Europe) are also the regions with the strongest Welfare States. However, if a strong State can, under some conditions, encourage the development of CSOs, the latter can also emerge from the absence or a withdrawal of the State in basic social service provision. That is why we distinguish the field of intervention and the institutional context to analyze this question.

In the case of advocacy CSOs, substitution phenomena are not likely to appear. Indeed, the purpose of advocacy is to give advises and influence other actors (Governments, but also international institutions or businesses) but not to replace them. As a consequence, advocacy CSOs work as counter-power or partners but hardly as substitutes as they do not directly provide services to the population nor produce any goods.

However, in the case of service provision CSOs, substitution phenomena are more likely to occur. When the Welfare State does not assume its basic functions, CSOs emerge to fill the gap. Service provision CSOs can basically be divided in two main categories: Well-Being & Living Conditions and Housing & Development. In the Well-Being & Living Conditions field, this is especially true regarding basic social services (ex: education, health), but less the case for other sub-fields such as culture and recreation CSOs. It is important to underline that a CSO is not necessarily a substitute to the State if it is working in the fields of education or health. There are several cases (especially in Western Europe) where such CSOs actually cooperate with the State (most of the time through delegation of public services under strict regulation) but do not compete with it or replace it. In the Development & Housing field, we assume that CSOs are a substitute to the State in the cases of a lack of infrastructure building, access to credit, housing policies, industrial policies, regional policies and redistribution policies. Again, a differentiation between CSOs which actually replace the State and CSOs which cooperate with it in these fields must be done. Besides, in a wide range of sub-activities of this field, CSOs are rather complementary to the State by accompanying national policies through local and rural development programs, community economical associations, job training etc.

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3 By this term, we refer to the concept of Sen A. (1999)
4 See II.C Variation of CSO’s weight and power by field of intervention (p.17) for more information about our classifications
We argue that the purpose of the existence of CSOs is not to be a substitute for the State. CSOs respond to specific needs which cannot be satisfied by the State, international institutions or the market. When CSOs replace the State they are not acting in their natural range of intervention and are thus believed to be less efficient than the State itself. We believe that in the case of a failure of the State to fulfill its basic missions (be it for financial, political or ideological reasons) CSOs can only be a temporary substitute but they are neither efficient nor do they exist for this purpose.

E. Accountability issues regarding CSOs

Since the mid-1990s, the debate about CSOs’ accountability has been strengthening. This is the result of several factors, including the increasing number of CSOs associated to development aid programs, the growth of co-operations between international institutions and CSOs and some accusations of corruption and inefficiency of CSOs, particularly in Mozambique and Rwanda in 1994 (Bendell, 2006). Accountability issues regarding CSOs can basically be divided in two categories. At a micro level, accountability issues are either downward (i.e. the accountability of CSOs regarding the people affected by their work, especially in the development sector since a lot of Northern CSOs deal with population of the South) or upward (i.e. the accountability of CSOs regarding funders and governments, firms or international institution they work with). At a global level, i.e. when CSOs participate to the global governance, accountability issues concern the nature of the relationship of CSOs with international institutions, including the transparency of the relationship, the diversity of voices and the legitimacy of CSOs to intervene in the policy-making process.

Today, the major critics regarding CSOs’ accountability are focused on the upward side. These accusations are not without basis. Indeed, it is true that most of CSOs are not very transparent and accountable, especially regarding financial matters and internal transparency. Most of CSOs have a very informal structure and functioning. As a result, few CSOs are obliged or willingly refuse to publish regularly accounts of their financial or non-financial performance. The argument put forward by CSOs is usually a lack of resources (i.e. the cost of producing these reports) and the inefficiency of such practices (one major advantage of CSOs over public bodies is their flexibility, their efficiency and their quickness which is believed to be at least partially allowed by the absence of formal bureaucratic processes in their work).

Regarding global governance and the accountability of CSOs which are cooperating with international institutions, the three key criteria are the transparency of the relationship, of funding and the plurality of voices. Indeed, as international institutions have opened themselves to CSOs and have progressively allowed CSOs to influence their policy-making process\(^5\), the major concern has been the transparency of these relationships. That is, secret lobbying and hidden negotiations have been prohibited and efforts have been made to enhance the transparency of CSOs’ goals, why their intervention was relevant, who they represented etc. One of the objectives was notably to prevent the intrusion of “disguised” CSOs, defending private or even criminal interests. As for the legal requirements, funding checking and compulsory transparency of CSOs has increased this last decade, especially since 9/11 as counter-terrorist measures have been taken. Moreover, the question of the plurality of voices has been regularly raised, making it on of the key criteria of CSOs’ accountability.

\(^{5}\) At a various degree depending on the international organization which is concerned as we will see later in this paper.
on a global level. Indeed, one of the main reproaches made to CSOs which act at a global level is the overrepresentation of Northern CSOs. This is especially a problem when dealing with development and poverty issues as most of the populations which are concerned live in the South.

The non-profit sector is very young and has to create standards. Much work has still to be done as the sector is still under construction, nevertheless several initiatives have been taken by CSOs to respond to this lack of accountability. To date, there are two different strategies which seem to be dominant: labeling and codes of conduct through CSO coalitions.

Labeling consists in externalizing accountability. External organizations (most of the time also non-profit organizations, but sometimes also governmental organizations) define a list of criteria to be respected to obtain their label and accord the latter to CSOs respecting these criteria. These labeling organizations are responsible for the control and the watch of CSOs’ actions and can, at any time, remove their label from a CSO if they consider that the latter no longer respects its criteria. These organizations are mostly national or regional: IDEAS6 (France), “NGO Monitor”7 (Israel), the Commonwealth Foundation of Britain8 (intergovernmental organization) are examples of such non-profit labeling organizations.

The second strategy is that of the creation of charts and codes of conduct, most of the time in the frame of CSO coalitions. Following the structure of CSO coalitions, these charts are mostly signed by CSOs from a given country or region: the American Council for Voluntary International Action9, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation10, the Voluntary Action Network India11, the Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles12 (Europe) etc. Besides, some major international NGOs have strengthened their accountability and begun to chance their practices (especially regarding their relationship with Southern population directly affected by their work) such as Oxfam International which has facilitated the integration of Southern organizations as full members and engaged close dialogue with organizations which did not meet the criteria for full membership or the WWF which has also led a similar policy, by adding Southern program officers on its board, as Northern people were overrepresented in its regular board (Bendell, 2006).

It is not yet clear which of these two strategies will dominate and structure the sector in the future. Each strategy has its advantages and its drawbacks. Indeed, the major argument of labeling is the clear separation between CSOs and the organizations in charge of their watch, which makes control procedures easier and prevents conflicts of interests. However, one of the major critics of such initiatives is that they focus on upward accountability and not on downward accountability. Indeed, for many CSOs, it is more important to be transparent and accountable to their “clients” (the people they advocate for, the beneficiaries of the services they provide etc.) rather than to their funder and/or their institutional partners (governments, firms, international institutions). Moreover, labeling is rather a top-down approach which is probably not the most efficient one to regulate the

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6 http://www.ideas.asso.fr/
7 http://www.ngo-monitor.org/
8 http://www.commonwealthfoundation.com/
9 http://www.interaction.org/about
10 http://www.cccic.ca/
11 http://www.vanindia.org/content.php?id=24
non-profit sector. Indeed, according to Olivier Consolo, director of CONCORD\textsuperscript{13}, the non-profit sector is very reluctant to top-down approaches. There is a culture of bottom-up management in these organizations which is not really compatible with a system of external organizations imposing their criteria to the sector.
That is why the development of an auto-regulation of the sector through regional standards in the frame of CSO coalitions is believed to be a possible alternative to labeling. However, this approach has its own limits, especially when it comes to controlling procedures. Indeed, most of these CSO coalitions have very few tools to control that their members and/or the CSOs which have signed their chart do respect the latter. One possible monitor tool which is emerging is that of “open-street monitoring”. It consists in an open platform (most of the time online) where people affected by the work of CSOs can express their mind, denounce abuses, make propositions etc. Many CSO executives are very enthusiastic about this new tool because it corresponds much more to their idea of downward accountability and citizen’s governance.

The non-profit sector is thus in a structuring phase. Even if there is still work to do, CSOs have become globally much more transparent and accountable this last decade, especially when cooperating with international institutions. As the civil society sector will much likely develop in the future, especially regarding its cooperation with international institutions (see part II of this paper) CSOs will have to follow the current trend by enhancing their upward accountability. By becoming more and more formal, the civil society sector faces however two major challenges. First, this bureaucratization of CSOs could threaten their flexibility and exclude smaller CSOs which do not have enough resources to implement proper financial and non-financial reporting. Second, there is a non-negligible risk that a focus on reporting will favor short-term, easy to quantify goals instead of long-term strategies.
Whether standard creation will be achieved through a top-down labeling or a bottom-up approach through CSO coalition and open-street monitoring is still uncertain. This illustrates the current confrontation between CSOs and governments or international institutions. Where the latter ask for more control and more evaluation, the non-profit sector is rather focused on the outcome of these evaluations and the development of a “learning from evaluating” culture which is not well implemented yet.

II. CSOs’ power and structure at a national and regional level

In this section, we will evaluate the weight of CSOs at a national level. After having introduced our approach (A), we will first study the variation of CSOs’ power and the structure amongst countries (B) and by field of intervention (C). Then we will examine CSO’s revenue structure, taking into account variations observed previously amongst countries and fields of intervention (D). To finish, we will summarize our findings by regrouping countries amongst a set of typologies of the development of the civil society sector (E).

\textsuperscript{13} A European NGO confederation for relief and development, regrouping over 1,800 CSOs
A. A quantitative approach based on three main criteria: the capacity, the sustainability and the impact of CSOs

Our approach is mostly based on the Comparative Nonprofit Project (CNP)\textsuperscript{14} of the John Hopkins University (Salamon \textit{et al.} 1995-2010).

We inform the reader that, for some countries (especially Southern countries), data updates were not always available. Thus, some of the data presented in the tables below are taken from the first results of the study (ca. 1995-2000). However, for several countries, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Chile, Denmark, Hungary, France, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Mozambique, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland and Thailand, updated data are available\textsuperscript{15} (2001 to 2010, depending on the country). We argue that these figures are still relevant since the CNP is mainly focused on relative considerations rather than absolute ones, which are not likely to change radically in a few years. Moreover, in this paper we focus on indentifying major trends and do not compute or use the figures of the CNP to achieve a more advanced quantitative model. Finally, these are most likely the most recent and complete quantitative and comparative data of the civil society sector available. In this context, we argue that these data are a good start to evaluate broadly the importance of civil society.

Based on the CNP and the construction of the JHU/GCSI (Salamon \textit{et al.}, 1995-2010), we evaluate CSO’s influence with three criteria which we detail below.

Capacity
It is a measure of the size and the financial and human resources mobilized by the civil society sector in a country. It includes:

- Paid staff (as the number of full-time equivalent paid workers as a share of the country’s economically active population);
- Volunteering (as the number of full-time equivalent volunteers as a share of the country’s economically active population);
- The amount of charitable contribution (as a share of the country’s GDP), which represents the additional resources raised by CSOs (which would not exist without CSOs’ existence);
- The degree of diversification of CSOs (as the distribution of CSOs’ workforce among different fields of intervention). This is justified because, other things being equal, a diversified civil

\textsuperscript{14} The CNP project is an empirical study which has begun in the early 1990s and is still running today. It has collected data in more than 40 countries throughout the world during this time. In its early phase, it is conducted in 36 representative countries (both developed and developing) and data are aggregated in comparative tables. Developed countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United States, United Kingdom. Developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda. Transitional countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, South Korea, Slovakia. Later on, data from Canada, New Zealand, Denmark, Switzerland, Chile, Republic of Korea and Portugal were added. It is noticeable that data on China and Russia were not collected, most certainly due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable data. See \url{http://ccss.jhu.edu/research-projects/comparative-nonprofit-sector/about-cnp} for more details about the project.

\textsuperscript{15} See \url{http://ccss.jhu.edu/research-projects/un-nonprofit-handbook/un-handbook-publications} and \url{http://ccss.jhu.edu/research-projects/comparative-nonprofit-sector/cnp-publications} for more detailed analysis of the civil society sector in these countries.
society which is present in various fields of activities has a stronger capacity to influence economical, social and environmental issues at a national level than a civil society which is focused on a narrower range of activities.

**Sustainability**

It is a measure the ability of the civil society sector to maintain its strength over time, which includes a certain security level in resources supply (both financial and human) and the measurement of a more or less favorable environment. It includes:

- Auto-financing (as the total amount of fees, proceeds from the sale of goods, membership dues, and investment income received by CSOs in a country as a share of CSOs’ total national revenue);
- Government funding (as the total amount of government grants, subsidies and reimbursement payments made to CSOs as a share of CSOs’ total national revenue);
- Popular support (as the number volunteers as a share of the adult population of the country);

**Impact**

It is a measure of the contribution of civil society at the social, economical and political levels. It includes:

- “Value added” which, in the case of CSOs is roughly approximated by the value of the labor inputs (including paid workers’ wages and volunteers’ imputed wages) computed as a share of the country’s GDP;
- Human service contribution (as CSOs’ share of total employment in key human service fields, i.e. health, education, social services, and culture and recreation);
- Contribution to advocacy, (as CSOs’ workforce – both paid staff and volunteers – devoted to advocacy activities as a share of the adult population of the country)

### B. Variation of CSOs’ weight and structure by country

Because of historical, cultural and social differences but also various level of economical development, the weight of CSOs at a national level varies greatly among countries.

First, there is an important variation regarding human resources of CSOs (see fig 2.1 below). As expected, there is a clear difference between developed and developing countries in terms of capacity of the civil society. This does however not mean that there is less solidarity in the South. Indeed there are strong traditions of familial and community networks and help in these countries (Salamon *et al.*, 2010). However these figures show that solidarity in the South is much less institutionalized and organized in what we have defined the civil society and much more local than in the North.

Second, there is an important variation regarding the reliance on volunteers of CSOs between the different countries (see figure 2.3 below). One interesting finding is that volunteering is not a substitute for paid staff (Salamon *et al.*, 2004). Actually, generally speaking, the larger the paid civil society workforce the larger the volunteering workforce (the only exception are the Nordic countries *i.e.* Sweden, Finland and Norway where volunteering indeed replaces paid staff. This aspect will be
developed later on). This underlines the fact that volunteering is no trivial act: it has to be organized, managed and supervised. This is exactly what paid staff is very useful for.

Figure 2.1: CSO workforce as a share of the economically active population, by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Workforce as a % of EAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42 countries</td>
<td>5.6% 15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Salamon, Sokolowski and Associates, Global Civil Society, 3rd ed. (Kumarian Press 2010)

Figure 2.2: CSO workforce as a share of the economically active population, by level of development
The break-up between developed and developing and transitional countries does also appear when the sustainability and impact criteria are added (see figure 2.4 and 2.5). However, if these aggregated data show some general trends, a deeper analysis of each country cluster is necessary in order to understand the influence and structure of CSOs. This includes particularly the distribution of CSOs’ capacities amongst fields of intervention and their revenue structure.

Figure 2.4 JHU/GCSI by country

Figure 2.4 and 2.5 are graphic representation of the results of the CNP published in 2004 in *Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector* (Salamon et al.). Data are thus aggregated in an index in order to be able to compare countries between themselves.

C. Variation of CSOs’ weight and structure by field of intervention

CSOs’ weight and structure varies depending on the geographical localization but there are also important variations amongst the different fields where CSO intervene.

The CNP has developed an International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations (ICNPO) divided in twelve fields. In this paper, we focus on five fields which correspond to a certain number of ICNPO fields. We associate each field with the AUGUR working papers which are concerned (see table 1.1).

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17 In this graphic, regions are defined as follows. 1) Developed countries. Anglo-Saxon: Australia, United Kingdom, United States; Nordic: Finland, Norway, Sweden; European Welfare Partnership: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Spain; Asian Industrialized: Japan, South Korea. 2) Developing and transitional countries. Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru; Africa: Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda; Central and Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia; Other Developing: Egypt, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines.
Table 1.1: classification of CSOs’ activities by field

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>ICNPO</th>
<th>AUGUR Working Paper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Well-being and Living Conditions</td>
<td>Education, Social Services, Health, Culture and Recreation</td>
<td>WP7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic and Human Rights</td>
<td>Civic and Advocacy International</td>
<td>WP6 – WP8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor and Farmer Rights</td>
<td>Union and Professional</td>
<td>WP6 – WP8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development and Housing</td>
<td>Development and Housing</td>
<td>WP4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and Technology</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>WP3 – WP5 – WP6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>WP2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Well-being and living conditions
This field is made up of CSOs which provide education services, every sort of healthcare services (hospitals, nursing homes, mental health, emergency medical services etc.), various social services (child welfare, adoption services, youth prevention programs, teen pregnancy help, drop-out prevention, wife-beating assistance, family assistance, services for the handicapped, old people, temporary shelter for homeless, immigrants assistance, food assistance etc.) and culture and recreation services (cultural and artistic organizations, sport associations, recreation and leisure clubs, social clubs etc.). As a consequence, it is mostly made up of service-dominant CSOs. This is the traditional and historical dominant field of the civil society: it absorbs 70% of the global civil society workforce. It is particularly developed in Western countries (except in Nordic countries and Austria where it is comparably weaker) where it often accounts for more than 80% of domestic total civil society workforce (these differences among countries will be explored more deeply later in this paper, when we will introduce the regional patterns). This field attracts the major part of paid staff (see fig. 3.2 below), especially in the education and health sub-fields. This is allowed by the significant public financial support enjoyed by the well-being field, which is the highest of all fields, the share of public funding in total revenue in some of the subfields such as health and social services almost reaching 50% (see fig. 4.1).

Civic and Human Rights
This field is made up of CSOs which defend human rights in general but also some vulnerable populations (woman, children, handicapped people, minorities etc.), peace organizations, civil rights associations, pro democratic organizations etc. Thus, they are almost exclusively advocacy CSOs. It is one of the strongest advocacy fields, accounting for 6% of total civil society workforce. This field is especially developed in Nordic countries (accounting for almost 13% of domestic civil society workforce). This field relies heavily on volunteers, who account for 7% of total volunteer workforce. Thus, fees (mostly membership fees) and philanthropic sources are the most important revenue sources (respectively 39% and 32% of total revenue).
**Labor and Farmer Rights**

This field is made up of organizations which promote and protect the interests of employees and farmers, such as labor unions and farmer’s associations. Again, these are almost exclusively advocacy-dominant CSOs.

Together with civic associations, the Labor and Farmer Rights sector is the largest of pure advocacy fields, accounting for 5% of total civil society workforce. Again, it is particularly developed in Nordic countries (almost 12% of total domestic civil society workforce) but also in lesser developed countries such as African ones (more than 10% of total domestic workforce). We assume that in Nordic countries this field is dominated by unions whereas farmer’s associations are predominant in lesser developed countries.

Its workforce structure is more or less balanced between paid and volunteer staff. However, its revenue structure is heavily dominated by membership fees which represent 82% of total revenue.

**Development and Housing**

This field is made up of CSOs which develop economic infrastructures (buildings, roads, microfinance etc.) and implement local and rural development programs, community economical associations (ex: poor people’s cooperatives), housing assistance, financing and rehabilitation organizations, job training and counseling organizations etc. These are mostly hybrid CSOs which provide most of the time very concrete services to the population but also have a strong empowerment and advocacy aspect in their work.

This field is the largest non-well-being one, accounting for 7% of total civil society workforce. It is especially widely spread in lesser developed countries where it accounts for more than 15% of domestic total civil society workforce. This is quite comprehensible, as poverty issues and basic development programs are focussed on these countries.

The workforce structure of this field is more or less balanced between paid and volunteer staff. Fees are the main source of revenues for development CSOs (56% of total revenue). We assume that they come essentially from economical and financing associations which often make profitable investments and/or try to establish business-like rules (ex: microcredit institutes, economical rehabilitation programs etc.), and from housing associations which often collect rents or membership fees. Public funding also accounts for a sizable share with 30% of total revenue.

**Environment and technology**

This field is made up of organizations which fight against any type of pollution (air, water, waste, noise, wave, radiations etc.), promote natural resources preservations and sustainable development, landscape-preservation organizations, animal and biodiversity protection organizations etc. This field is essentially composed of advocacy-dominant CSOs. Even if some environmental CSOs do implement projects and provide services they are always accompanied by advocacy and consciousness raising actions.

This is a very recent and emerging field as its existence as a significant sector does not exceed a couple of decades. Furthermore, environmental associations still have to convince a share of the population that its actions are relevant. Indeed, contrary to traditional fields such as well-being, development, civic, labor and farmer rights, which are commonly regarded as relevant issues by almost everyone, a constantly decreasing but nevertheless sizable share of the population still thinks that ecological issues are a nonsense.
This is reflected by the relatively small size of the environmental sector which accounts for only 2% of total civil society workforce. Most of the environmental CSOs are located in Western countries, which, together, account for 76% of total civil society workforce dedicated to the environmental cause. However we notice that the environmental field is prettily implanted in African countries where its share of domestic total civil society workforce can reach up to 10.6% in Tanzania. We assume that this is the consequence of several CSOs which deal with water pollution and supply and air pollution issues in these countries.

There are, on average, more volunteers than paid staff in environmental CSOs, however the trend is not significant. The financial structure of this field is very balanced, fees, government funding and philanthropic sources each accounting for about one third of total revenue.

An important feature of this field is that it is rapidly moving and growing as shown by the significant place it has gained in the media despite its relatively small size compared to the other civil society sectors. Thus, the assessments we have just made might evolve substantially in the coming years.

**Finance**

This field is made up of CSOs which try to influence financial markets and financial regulations to achieve a fairer, more efficient, more sustainable and a more responsible finance. This includes, in particular, CSOs advocating the taxation of financial transactions, the reformation of accounting standards, the implementation of new performance and macro-economical indicators and CSOs promoting or proposing local/alternative currencies\(^\text{18}\).

This is also an emergent field, even more recent than the environmental field. It is the response of civil society to the growing and intrusive power of financial markets. Although some financial CSOs have been created before (ex: the French CSO ATTAC), this movement has been strengthen by the financial crisis of 2007-2008 which has brought global financial issues to the public debate.

The finance field is still a niche sector of civil society, even if some international organizations are emerging (ex: the European CSO Financial Watch). As a consequence, precise quantitative data on this field are not available. The major question about to this field is whether we will witness the emergence of a sizable financial field or if this movement will be stuck to the niche level.

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\(^{18}\) By local currencies we refer to what has been implemented in some countries in times of great monetary distress and instability of the national currency. This has been the case, for instance, in several Argentinian provinces during the 1980’s and the 1990’s (Théret, to be published in 2012).

By alternative currencies we refer to non monetary currencies such as time exchanges (ex: the French “La Banque du Temps”, a system where people trade time instead of using money – for instance one our of plumbing for one hour of piano lesson).
As shown in figure 3.1, well-being CSOs are dominant in terms of workforce, representing 70% of the total workforce, education and social services being by far the largest fields (respectively 21% and 20%) followed closely by culture and recreation CSOs (17%). The advocacy sector taken as a whole is however quite sizable (about 20% of total workforce, almost 30% if religious groups are included), civic CSOs and labor CSOs being dominant (5% each), just behind the hybrid sector, development and housing (7%). This is nevertheless a global picture which does not take into account the great variations among countries. The rest of civil society sector’s workforce (less than 10%) is distributed between religious congregations, philanthropic fund raising organizations and not elsewhere classified organizations. As explained before, we do not focus on these sectors, but we nevertheless note that they are not negligible.

As shown in figure 3.2, although the largest share for both paid staff and volunteers goes to service provision fields, paid staff are essentially focused on service provision fields (73% of total paid staff efforts) while volunteers are actually dominant in advocacy (or expressive) fields.
The global trends we have identified are rather true for most of the countries, service provision functions being dominant in 27 of the 33 countries. Some differences nevertheless appear between developed and developing countries. First, in developing countries, paid staff is very focused on service provision fields (almost 80% of total paid staff) while volunteers tend to be dominant in advocacy CSOs\(^\text{19}\). This is not the case in developing and transitional countries, where paid and volunteer staff focus alike in service provision CSOs. This could be explained by the lack of public funding going to service provision CSOs in developing countries which obliges volunteers to handle these functions more fully. Second, in developing countries the Development & Housing sector is much higher (5% in developed countries vs. 9% in developing countries, 18% for Africa alone). This is indeed an important statement because as we have seen, Development & Housing CSOs most of the time also provide some empowerment and advocacy work. This suggests that grassroots civil movements are particularly strong in developing countries (Salamon et al., 2004).

\(^{19}\) Salamon’s classification differs slightly from ours. Thus, development and housing is considered as a “service” sector, whereas the author argues that it could as well be classified in the “expressive” sector as it is a hybrid one.
D. CSO’s revenue structure

To have a better picture of CSOs’ actions and their sustainability it is important to analyze their revenue structure. Of course, it varies amongst countries and fields of intervention. However, this does not prevent to make some general statements.

The largest source of CSOs are fees (including the amounts charged for the services provided and related commercial income from investments, dues etc.) which, on average, represent more than half of CSOs’ revenues (see figure 4.1). It is followed by public sources (including government subsidies and public reimbursement payments). Contrary to what is commonly thought philanthropy (including private giving from individuals, foundations and businesses) only accounts for 15% of CSOs’ revenues. This is an important statement because it says a lot about CSOs’ sustainability and autonomy.

![Figure 4.1: Source of Revenue of CSOs, 39 Country average*](image)

* Unweighted average


It is however interesting to note that if volunteer time value is added to philanthropy it doubles the share of the latter (about 30% vs 15%). Fees stay nonetheless the first source of revenues (about 40%) and government funding only represents about 30% (Salamon et al., 2004). This actually shows that people prefer to give their time rather than their money which is an interesting indicator of people’s involvement in civil society.
As we have seen before, this classification stays valid for most of the fields (see figure 4.2).

- Labor and Farmer Rights (including unions), Civic and Human Rights, Environment and Technology: membership fees dominant fields of intervention.
- Development and Housing: the housing sector is fee dominant (mostly from rents and membership fees) whereas the other development organizations are more balanced between government and fees revenues. Philanthropy is always a minor source of revenues.
- Well-being: education and culture are fee dominant (respectively tuition payments and membership fees) whereas health and social services are more balanced between fees and government funding. Philanthropy is always a minor source of revenues.
- Religion: it is the only sector where philanthropy is clearly the major source of revenue.

However, beyond these global considerations, important differences between countries persist (see figure 4.3). Countries can be basically distinguished between two categories: fee-dominant countries and government-dominant ones. We note that there is no country which is philanthropy-dominant (the share of philanthropic financial sources can nevertheless be quite sizable in some countries, for instance in Pakistan or Uganda). Most of the countries (25 out of 39) are fee-dominant, in accordance with the global trend shown in figure 4.1. However, some countries, mostly Western European countries, are government-dominant countries. This can be explained by the Western European model of welfare state which often consists in creating partnership with CSOs by financing them but letting them manage the delivery of the services. This has boosted the growth of civil society in these countries and is one of the explanations of the important civil society sector of these countries. We will explore the different models of each region more deeply in the next section.
E. Typology of countries regarding the civil society sector

In this section, we try to draw some regional patterns of the development of the civil society sector. This classification, based on the work of Salamon et al., is of course questionable as it is very complicated to make global assessment as each country has its specifications. While some countries can be clearly identified with a given category, some others are rather hybrid and a few do not fit any of these categories. This is, for instance, the case of Argentina, which is well above other Latin American countries in terms of size of its civil society sector (which can be compared with most of Western European countries) but follows the Latin American trend in terms of financing structure and field focus. However, we argue that this framework helps to draw a global map of CSO’s size, structure and revenues, even if it is far from being perfect.
Table 5.1: Models of Civil Society Sector Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Workforce Size</th>
<th>Volunteer Share</th>
<th>Government Support</th>
<th>Philanthropic Support</th>
<th>Expressive Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Medium-high</td>
<td>Medium-small</td>
<td>Medium-high</td>
<td>Smaller than service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Partnership</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Low-medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Smaller than service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Larger than service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferred Democratization</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>Smaller than service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Medium-high</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>Smaller than service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Salamon et al., Switzerland CNP National report, 2005

The first three models concern developed Western countries. They correspond more or less to the standard “types of capitalism” which can be distinguished among OECD countries. Indeed, the Liberal model corresponds to the “market-based” one, the Welfare Partnership to the “European Continental” and “Mediterranean” clusters and the Social Democratic CSO model correspond to the capitalist model of the same name (Amable & Petit, 2002). In these regions, civil society is very developed compared to the rest of the world and well implemented for a long time.

1. The Liberal (Anglo-Saxon) model

This country cluster includes the USA, the UK, New Zealand and with some restrictions Australia, Canada, Switzerland.

These countries are characterized by a high level of development and a relatively low level of welfare state (this is a bit less true for the UK and Switzerland, which are in fact hybrid models between the Anglo-Saxon and the Western European welfare state model).

That is why these countries rely heavily on CSOs, which is reflected by their civil society workforce which is, in absolute figures, the largest of all regional groups (42% of the total civil society workforce, see table 5.4) and represents 8.7% of the total active population of liberal countries, which is almost equal to the welfare partnership group of countries (see fig. 5.1). The civil society sector attracts quite a lot of volunteers (44% of total civil society workforce): this is above the all country average, but not the highest share of all regional groups (see fig. 5.2).

The dominant field is well-being (almost 80% of total workforce). The dominant subfield varies among countries: for instance, health services prevail in the USA while education dominates in the UK and Australia. Compared to the other developed regions, the Anglo-Saxon cluster has a very strong development sector (it represents almost 9% of its total workforce compared to 3.5% and 4.8%, see table 5.2). This predominance of well-being and development services can be explained by the relative withdrawal of the welfare state in these countries, giving the relay to private
organizations. Even if the share of environmental CSOs is quite small compared to other fields (only 1.6% of total civil society workforce) it is the second largest environmental sector after the welfare partnership cluster (35% of the global civil society workforce dedicated to the environmental cause, compared to 39% for the welfare partnership cluster, see table 5.4).

CSOs’ revenues come mainly from fees (51% of total revenue), essentially resulting from fees charged for the services provided in the well-being sector (health, scholarship fees for the education sector etc.). Government support is weaker than in other developed regions (35% of total revenue versus 38% in the social democratic cluster and 56% in the welfare partnership group). This is again a consequence of the weaker welfare state of liberal countries compared to the other developed ones. Although philanthropy resources are quite sizable in liberal countries (13% of total revenue), it is not the dominant revenue source of CSOs as commonly thought, even in this region.

**Figure 1.11: Civil Society Sector Workforce (as a share of economically active population)**

![Figure 1.11: Civil Society Sector Workforce](source: Salamon et al., Switzerland CNP National Report, 2005)
2. The Social Democratic (Nordic) model

This country cluster includes Finland, Norway, Sweden and with some restrictions Austria. These countries are characterized by a high level of development and a strong tradition of welfare state. This has led to a very particular structure of civil society. Indeed, in these countries, the strong tradition of welfare state has left little room for CSOs to deliver basic social and human services. This is shown by a very weak well-being sector compared to other developed countries, with less than 70% of total workforce allocated to this sector compared to
respectively almost 80% for liberal countries and 85% for the welfare partnership cluster. Actually, most of well-being workforce in these countries is focused on culture, which leaves the core welfare services (health, education, social services) even weaker. However, this does not mean that civil society is inexistent in the social democratic countries. Even if civil society workforce is roughly 1% smaller than in other developed countries it still represents 7.6% of the total active population which is well above developing countries (respectively 2.6% and 2% for the deferred democratization cluster and the traditional one). The specificity of the social democratic countries is the huge size of the Civic & Human Rights and the Labor & Farmer Rights sectors which together represent almost 25% of total civil society workforce of these countries, far above the other countries, both developed and developing ones. There are two main explanations for this situation. First, as the state takes care of the basic social necessities, people’s volunteering time which goes to well-being CSOs is smaller. Second, these countries are dotted with very powerful unions and a long tradition for the defense of civic rights. Nevertheless, one must never forget that these countries are very small in terms of population and that, even if they have a very strong civil society sector, once compared to the global civil society workforce, they do not represent a significant share, except maybe for the Civic & Human Rights and Farmer & Labor Rights sectors where they still count for 5% of the total workforce for each of these sectors.

As mentioned above, civil society relies heavily on volunteering in these countries, which represents 65% of total civil society workforce, far above other countries (especially Western European ones, where volunteering only represents 31% of total civil society workforce). This can be explained easily because service-oriented CSOs (essentially present in the well-being sector) traditionally rely heavily on paid staff whereas advocacy-oriented CSOs, which are particularly strong in social democratic countries, rely rather on volunteers.

The revenue structure of CSOs in the social democratic cluster is quite comparable to the liberal one, as fees are the dominant financing source. However, contrary to liberal countries, they come mainly from membership fees rather than amounts charged for services provided. Government support is quite comparable to the one in the liberal cluster however the explanation might again differ. The relative small share of government support results in this case from a focus of the state on well-being and social services rather than a withdrawal of the state. Again philanthropy’s share is quite small, with only 9% of total CSOs’ revenue.

3. The Welfare Partnership (Western European) model

This country cluster includes Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands and, with some restrictions, Spain, Italy, Portugal. These countries are characterized by a high level of development and a tradition of several interest groups acting in cooperation with a strong welfare state to achieve common societal goals. We can notice that Israel is included in this group although it is not a Western European country. This is because despite geographical distance, Israel has followed a quite similar path than Western European countries concerning CSOs and has been influenced by the European socio-political model. Thus, the size of civil society of these countries is the largest of all groups in relative figures (almost 9% of the economically active population of these countries on average, but it can rise up to 15.9% in the Netherlands and 13.1% in Belgium). Despite the relative small share of Western European countries in the world population, their absolute share of global civil society workforce reaches 20%.
This can be explained by the partnership model of Western European states which we have described above. In these countries, the welfare state has traditionally played a central role but, contrary to social democratic countries, it cooperates with non-governmental organizations, historically church-related ones, to deliver social services. It is important to note that a large part of these organizations today are separated from the Church and have nothing in common with worship groups. However, a sizable number of CSOs remain more or less influenced by religious values, such as Christian charity.

As a consequence, Western European CSOs are heavily focused on well-being service provision which absorb almost 85% of total civil society workforce in these countries which is about 5% more than in liberal countries, 15% more than in social democratic countries and even more for most of developing countries. Besides, even if the share of environmental CSOs compared to other fields is not very high in Western European countries (2% of total civil society workforce) it is still the highest of all developed regions. Moreover, 39% of the global civil society workforce dedicated to the environmental cause is located in the welfare partnership cluster, making it the largest civil society environmental sector in the world despite the relative limited population of Europe in the world.

In these countries, the share of paid staff of civil society workforce is by far the largest of all countries with almost 70% FTE employees, compared to less than 50% in almost every country cluster (the deferred democratization cluster being the exception, but for a different reason). This is allowed by a close cooperation of the civil society sector with governments and important public funding. Indeed, the welfare partnership cluster is the only one which has a government-dominant revenue structure, government subsidies and affiliated financial flows representing 56% of total revenue. Fees are also quite a sizable source of revenue (35%) even if it is less than in any other country cluster. Philanthropy, as elsewhere, does not represent a large share of CSOs’ revenues (only 9%).

Table 5.2: Distribution of Civil Society Workforce (paid and volunteers) by Field, by Region, 32 countries (percent of total workforce, unweighted average*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Well-being</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Civic</th>
<th>Labor &amp; Farmer</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>79,93</td>
<td>1,60</td>
<td>8,97</td>
<td>4,23</td>
<td>2,90</td>
<td>2,40</td>
<td>100,03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>69,90</td>
<td>1,13</td>
<td>3,43</td>
<td>12,97</td>
<td>11,57</td>
<td>1,00</td>
<td>100,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Partnership</td>
<td>84,86</td>
<td>2,00</td>
<td>4,80</td>
<td>3,66</td>
<td>2,95</td>
<td>1,68</td>
<td>99,95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferred Democratization</td>
<td>76,01</td>
<td>2,28</td>
<td>5,08</td>
<td>3,53</td>
<td>10,12</td>
<td>3,02</td>
<td>100,04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>63,20</td>
<td>3,41</td>
<td>15,40</td>
<td>6,43</td>
<td>5,73</td>
<td>6,91</td>
<td>101,09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*each country weights one, whatever its population or workforce size.
Read this table: on average, well-being CSOs attract 79.93% of total workforce in liberal countries.

Table 5.3: Distribution of Civil Society Workforce (paid and volunteers) by Field, by Region, 32 countries (thousand of FTE staff)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Well-being</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Civic</th>
<th>Labor &amp; Farmer</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>13762,79</td>
<td>204,47</td>
<td>519,25</td>
<td>830,19</td>
<td>565,58</td>
<td>363,00</td>
<td>16665,28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>437,71</td>
<td>9,14</td>
<td>24,30</td>
<td>81,53</td>
<td>82,69</td>
<td>8,16</td>
<td>643,53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Partnership</td>
<td>6454,41</td>
<td>225,80</td>
<td>366,60</td>
<td>352,18</td>
<td>254,74</td>
<td>219,88</td>
<td>7913,62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferred Democratization</td>
<td>4549,10</td>
<td>43,36</td>
<td>196,83</td>
<td>152,22</td>
<td>404,81</td>
<td>352,35</td>
<td>5708,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>7100,86</td>
<td>94,23</td>
<td>352,02</td>
<td>197,75</td>
<td>187,81</td>
<td>433,66</td>
<td>8410,36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32308,87</td>
<td>577,01</td>
<td>1899,99</td>
<td>1613,90</td>
<td>1555,64</td>
<td>1387,05</td>
<td>39341,46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4: Distribution of Civil Society Workforce (paid and volunteers) by Field, by Region, 32 countries (data from table 1.4 in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Well-being</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Civic</th>
<th>Labor &amp; Farmer</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Partnership</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferred Democratization</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Read this table: 43% of the total workforce of well-being CSOs (from the 34 countries where data are available) is located in liberal countries.

The last two country clusters are mainly composed (but not only) of developing and transitional countries. These groups are less homogeneous than the first ones and sometimes classification can be quite approximate. In these countries, civil society plays a much smaller role than in the first three groups, commonly referred as the “Western developed countries”.

4. The Deferred Democratization model (Latin America, Eastern Europe and CIS, Industrialized Asia)

This country cluster includes Brazil, Colombia, Poland, Slovakia, and, with some restrictions, Czech Republic, Japan, South Korea, Hungary, Mexico, Peru and Romania (plus Russia and China). It can be divided in three sub-groups: CIS and Eastern European countries, Latin American countries and industrialized Asian countries. They are characterized by a historically authoritarian state (even if in most of the countries it is not the case any more). When a significant level of development has been reached, it has taken the form of an economical boom and a very rapid growth (ex: Japan, South Korea). Most of the other countries are transitional countries with relatively high levels of growth. As stated before, we have no empirical data on Russia and China. However, we argue that, given the cultural and economical characteristics of these countries, they would be included in this country cluster. Indeed, Russia and China are both characterized by a long history of authoritarian State which has limited (sometimes forbidden) the development of CSOs. We assume that Russia has a civil society structure which is very similar to Central and Eastern European countries as they were part of the same body (the former U.S.S.R.). This means that they presented similar characteristics in the early 1990s and share a large pat of their culture and history. China is closer to the Industrialized Asian countries. As Japan and South Korea its economical development has taken the form of an economical boom (which, in the case of China, is still occurring today). As Japan and South Korea, China has quite a specific civil society sector (Jie, 2009), which is dominated by government organized NGOs (GONGOs). Besides, China is culturally relatively close to the other industrialized Asian countries.

Thus, generally speaking, the traditional authoritarian states in these countries have prevented, or at least not supported, the emergence of significant civil society sector which was seen damageable to the state’s authority or to the economical growth which was often (or is still) the primary goal of the society. Even if a lot of countries have more or less abandoned this path, this historical trend is reflecting the small size of the civil society sector in these countries, which represents only 2.6% of the economically active population, compared to more than 7.5% in the Western countries.
The main sector in these countries is well-being which absorbs about 76% of total civil society workforce, which is quite comparable with most of Western countries. The dominant sub-level varies among countries: health and education for industrialized Asian countries (mostly GONGOs such as public benefit corporations, medical corporations, private school corporations and social welfare corporations), culture for CIS and Eastern European countries (mostly former State-controlled CSOs during the Soviet era which have been able to make the transition into nonprofit status) and education for Latin American countries (mostly religious schools). In the case of industrialized Asian countries, the predominance of the education and health sectors can be explained by the historical focus on rapid growth which has left little room for basic public services. Concerning CIS and Eastern European countries, the former communist system in these countries has left little room for welfare services outside sport and recreation clubs. The current situation most certainly reflects this historical trend. In the case of Latin American countries, the predominance of the education sector is explained by a quite inefficient public education system replaced by a very widely expanded network of religious schools open to all but also by several elite schools for fortunate children.

As participation in CSOs has never been really encouraged in these countries, the share of volunteers in civil society workforce is very low (32%). This is a comparable figure with Western European countries, but contrary to the latter, this rate cannot be explained by a strong trend to employ paid staff in CSOs but it is only the resulting of the marginalization of the civil society.

For the same reason, government financial support to civil society is also smaller than in every Western country cluster (even the liberal one), representing only 30% of total revenue. Fees are the dominant revenue source in these countries (57% of total revenue), although its nature varies among countries. In Asian industrialized countries it comes mainly from charged amounts from health and social services organizations, in Latin American countries the main source of revenues are scholarship fees and in Central and Eastern European countries it is dominated by membership fees.

It is noticeable that the Labor & Farmer Rights sector is relatively high and growing in this country cluster, accounting for more than 10% of total civil society workforce which is quite comparable with the social democratic country cluster and makes the former the second largest cluster in relative and absolute size (26% of the global civil society workforce dedicated to the defense of labor and farmer rights). This reflects the current trend of the development of community-based empowerment, pro-democratic and worker’s CSOs (including trade unions) in these countries which will much likely be at the core of the civil society dynamics in the following years in these countries, especially in Latin America.

5. The Traditional model (Africa, India and other developing countries with high poverty rates)

This country cluster includes Pakistan, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, the Philippines, and, with some restrictions, India, South Africa.

These countries are characterized by a lower level of development, more rural populations and high rates of poverty. Most of these countries are former colonies with limited democratic rules. The cases of India and South Africa are quite specific as they tend to differ from the rest of the traditional countries, including their higher level of development (although they are still developing countries). However, they still share some features which justify their classification as traditional countries. First of all, they both suffer from high poverty rates and huge income inequalities. In the case of India, the
size of the civil society sector is very small (only 1.4% of the economically active population) and comparable with the average of the traditional country cluster, especially as it focuses on development programs and poverty fighting. The case of South Africa is quite different. Indeed, the size of the civil society sector is remarkably large for a developing country (4.0% of the economically active population) with a sizable share of the Civic & Human right sector which is explained by the historical battle against apartheid. However, the South African civil society structure catches with the traditional model as it is characterized by a very large share of the development & housing sector (accounting for about 18% of the total South African civil society workforce) and a high reliance on international solidarity (both private and public).

Globally speaking, the size of the civil society sector in the traditional country cluster is the smallest of all regions: it represents only 2% of the economically active population, which is more than four times less than in Western European countries. One explanation of the incredibly weakness of the civil society sector is the lack of formal CSOs, solidarity being much more informal and community and/or family oriented in these countries.

Although well-being services stays the major sector (absorbing about 63% of total civil society workforce) it is the weakest of all country clusters. This can be explained by the extremely large size of the development sector compared to other groups: it accounts for more than 15% of total civil society workforce which is about twice more than in liberal countries and about three to five time the relative size of this sector in other country clusters. One explanation is the greater need for basic development programs, poverty assistance etc. in these countries than elsewhere. Moreover, as we have seen before, Development and Housing CSOs have most of the time at least some empowerment and advocacy features. This suggests that there is a marked tendency to grassroots empowerment in these countries, even if the civil society sector is relatively small. The environmental sector is also relatively sizable: with more than 3.4% of total civil society workforce allocated to the environmental sector, it is the largest relative sector of all five country clusters. However, in absolute size, it is only the third, far behind Western European and Anglo-Saxon countries with only 16% of total civil society workforce dedicated to the environmental cause. This can be explained by the important air and water pollution and water supply issues faced by these countries.

Volunteers represent a very high share of total civil society workforce (55%) making it the second country cluster in terms of relative size of volunteers. However this figure illustrates also the lack of resources of CSOs in these countries, which cannot afford to hire a lot of paid staff.

This is well illustrated by the revenue structure of CSOs in these countries which is characterized by an incredibly small share of government support (only 18%). This is one of the consequences of the lack of public resources (and sometimes corruption) in these countries. Fees, like in almost every country cluster, are also the dominant financial source. However, philanthropy’s share is the highest of all groups, representing almost 25% compared to an average of about 10% for the other country clusters. Even if there is a sizable grassroot community-based civil society sector in these countries, they still rely heavily on Western CSOs and international solidarity, including religious CSOs and some major philanthropic CSOs. As a consequence, the dynamism of the civil society sector in these countries, at least in the mid-term, depends a lot on international solidarity and Western efforts and voluntarism to make some wealth transfers.
These classifications show that the civil society sector is very heterogeneous. The development of CSOs depends on a lot of factors, including historical, cultural, economical, political and social factors. Not only do the size and the power of CSOs differ from one country to another but also the type of CSOs, the way they are organized, financed, the importance of religious CSOs etc. All in all, we have distinguished three main typologies – which correspond more or less to the three socio-economical models of Western countries – for developed countries, where CSOs are globally well established. In the case of developing countries, where CSOs are less established, we have identified two main country clusters. However, the situation of the civil society sector in many developing countries is likely to evolve rapidly in the future, especially for emerging countries such as China, India, Brazil or even Russia (see III. Prospective View through Scenarios, p. 48).

Now that we have established a general picture of the power of CSOs at a national and regional level, we will see how they organize themselves to deal with global issues and their relationship with international institutions and TNCs. We will see which national CSOs are able to go beyond their domestic range, which are their main strategies and what is their impact on global issues.
III. CSOs’ role in global governance

In a globalized world, current and future major issues will be more and more global, involving the entire world.

We have seen that CSOs play a central role at a national and regional level. Their weight, capacity, sustainability, impact and structure differ greatly depending on the social, cultural and economical background of countries. The question we now ask is whether these national or regional actions of CSOs can be extended to an international level. How and in which fields of intervention do national CSOs coordinate their actions to influence international institutions and Transnational Companies (TNCs)? Is there a benchmarking between national CSOs at an international level? Do CSOs have the capacity to influence sustainably international institutions’ policies and what are the drivers of this influence in the future? What will be the role of CSOs in global issues such as climate change, suppression of poverty, water supply, nuclear and biotechnologies, financial regulation, sustainable trade regulation etc.?

It is clear that CSOs’ role and influence in global governance depends on the field of intervention and of the international institution concerned. Some international institutions have a long history of cooperation with CSOs (this is the case of the United Nations and, to a lesser extent the European Union) whereas others have opened themselves to the civil society sector only in the last decades (for instance the Bretton Woods institutions, whose policy has been durably driven by the Washington Consensus in the past). Beyond specific policies of international institutions, the cooperation between CSOs and international institutions depends on push and pull factors, respectively the need of CSOs to work with international bodies and the need of international institutions to benefit from CSOs’ unique competences. Push factors are quite obvious. They include particularly financial needs (project funding), recognition and advertizing of specific social, economical and environmental issues. Pull factors are both political and operational. First, as international institutions face more and more critics regarding their technocratic nature and their lack of democracy, the inclusion of CSOs in their policy process is a way of legitimizing themselves. Second, because of their bureaucratic nature, international institutions lack the human resources and competences to conduct field studies, implement and evaluate concrete projects. That is why they need CSOs’ expertise in several fields of intervention and cooperate with them in order to understand people’s concerns, be aware of local and practical issues, gain the confidence of local population who most of the time trust CSOs much more than international institutions, delegate project implementation, use CSOs’ expertise to evaluate their policy at different levels (economical, social and environmental impact) etc. These push and pull factors of course depend greatly on the field of intervention which is concerned.

In some fields, for instance the development and housing one, CSOs are very implicated in global development policies, through the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) or international aid programs. International institutions are not in direct contact with the rural population of the South. They need CSOs to understand local and cultural issues which are at the center of every development program. CSOs bring issues to the agenda, participate to the debates during the policy elaboration phase, provide their services by implementing development projects and help international institutions to evaluate the real impact of their policies. But in other fields, such as finance, CSOs still have to prove that they are a legitimate actor in global governance. Cooperation with business lobbies and banking associations are preferred to cooperation with the few CSOs which exists so far in this sector. This is the result of the poor number of financial CSOs and the prominent liberal vision
of finance which claims that the financial sector should organize its governance itself. However, after
the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the obvious failure of the financial sector to be its self regulator,
and in the context of a raising financial CSO sector, this trend could change in the following years. To
take into account these specificities, we will structure our analysis of CSO’s role in global governance
around the different international institutions and main fields of intervention of CSOs.
In the present second part of this paper, we will evaluate the capacity, sustainability and impact of
CSOs in global governance. First, we will characterize the main civil society actors at a global level (A).
Then, we will study the frame of CSOs’ intervention in the United Nations and the European Union
(B). Afterwards, we will study the frame of intervention of CSOs in global development policies (C),
including their relation with the World Bank, with the IMF regarding financial regulation and with the
WTO regarding trade regulation. To finish, we will study CSOs role in the elaboration and the
implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) by TNCs (D).

A. Types and main strategies of civil actors at a global level

The rise of CSOs acting at a global level and acting as agents influencing global governance matches
with the development of new communication technologies, especially (but not only) the Internet.
Indeed, at a global level visibility, media coverage and legitimacy building are they key factors of
CSOs’ power. We remind the reader of the frame we use to evaluate CSO’s power: capacity (paid and
volunteer workforce, charitable contribution), sustainability (auto-funding, government subsidies,
popular support) and impact.

1. Main means and strategies of global CSOs to gain capacity,
sustainability and impact

Visibility and media coverage are key factors in order to build capacity for a global CSO. Indeed, the
charitable contribution it collects is directly correlated with the willingness of the people to give it
their money. It thus means that people know the CSO, have the opportunity to get easily basic
information about the CSO etc. But new communication technologies also allow CSOs to launch
media campaign or keep in touch with its major donators much more easily and cheaply.
Analogically, the number of volunteers it attracts is directly correlated with the willingness of the
people to give it their time. It is nevertheless less the case regarding paid staff, whose size rather
depends on the CSO’s financial resources, even if one could argue that a CSO will have facilities to
attract talented and motivated people at a lower cost if it is famous and has a positive image.

The sustainability of a global CSO also depends a lot on its visibility and media coverage. Indeed, the
same mechanisms as described above are at work regarding membership fees. Moreover, the
amount a CSO will be able to charge for its services and its number of clients (including governments,
TNCs and international institutions) also depend on its image. Besides, if a CSO is well-known and
widely recognized, it will have more opportunities to get public subsidies. To finish, its popular
support of course depend almost exclusively of its image and media coverage.
The impact of global CSO can be evaluated in two ways, which basically reflect the two main strategies of CSOs at a global level. The first strategy is that of working “within the system”. In this case, CSO try to cooperate with TNCs and international institutions, in order to influence their agenda or change their practices. CSO’s impact is thus measured through their ability to be recognized (sometimes formally) by international institutions and/or TNCs as legitimate actors and adviser. In the operational field, this is reflected by CSO’s ability to be in charge of the implementation or the evaluation of TNCs’ or international institution’s projects. Again, beyond technical requirements often asked by international institutions (ex: the UN) to gain a consultative status, the impact of CSOs in the case of “within the system” strategies depends essentially on their image and their ability to build networks (between CSOs but also other actors). New communication technologies are of course at the core of the latter.

The second strategy implemented by global CSOs is that of working “outside the system”. In this case, CSO protest against TNCs or international institution through “name and shame” strategies, media events and demonstrations (examples: Occupy Wall Street, The Battle of Seattle). Again, such strategies can only have an important impact throughout the world if cheap communications with a worldwide range are available.

Whether for capacity building, sustainability building or gaining impact, communication technologies are thus the main tools for CSOs at a global level. The raise of cheap, fast, universal and worldwide ranged communication technologies (such as the Internet) thus probably explains, in a large part, the boom of CSOs these last two decades, especially at a global level.

2. Types of civil actors at a global level

The major civil society actors at a global level are not necessarily the same than civil actors which act at a national and regional level. Indeed, to have an impact on global governance, CSOs need specific resources and sometimes have to match specific criteria to be recognized by international institutions (for instance, to obtain the consultative status by the UN). We distinguish four types of civil actors at a global level: international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), CSO federations, thematic coalition and expert groups (D’Orfeuil, 2006).

In some cases, CSOs which act at a national level also act at an international level. This is the case of the so called INGOs which are large organizations with an international range of intervention but which stay more or less linked with a particular country or region. These organizations can afford to act both at a national and global level because they have important financial and human resources. They are the most famous CSOs, are often very popular and are taken very seriously (either because of their competence or because of the potential threat they represent) by international institutions and TNCs. Greenpeace international, Oxfam International or Amnesty International are examples of such organizations.

These organizations are the most effective CSOs today. They have huge capacities: they are well organized bodies with a solid basis of paid staff who supervise and elaborate long term strategies. Because INGOs are well-known and carry a good image, they attract many volunteers (registered members but also people who participate temporarily or regularly to INGOs’ actions). Thanks to their
popularity and their paid staff which is very stable, they are able to elaborate long-term strategies of fundraising which allows them to raise sizable charitable funds. INGOs are also very sustainable organizations. Because of their experience, popularity and competences, they often perceive sizable government funding as well as membership fees which makes their financial sources very diversified. INGOs have also the most important impact on international institutions and TNCs, mostly because of their formal and institutionalized structure which is required to be recognized by some international institutions, especially the UN, and of their media coverage (D’Orfeuil, 2006).

INGOs present however some limits. First, they are almost exclusively Northern organizations: this is quite problematic, especially because a sizable part of INGOs deal with Southern issues (development, human and farmer rights etc.). Second, because they are huge organizations with sometimes a management style which can be more or less close to businesses, INGOs are sometimes criticized for their lack of proximity with field issues and popular claims. These limits lead to representation and legitimacy issues.

Large international CSOs are nevertheless not the only civil actors which can have an influence on the international scene. Smaller, national CSOs can regroup in CSO federations in order to increase their capacity, sustainability and impact. These federations can be geographical – i.e. national/regional federation of NGOs (ex: CONCONRD for Europe) – or thematic – i.e. homogenous groups of NGOs which work in the same field (ex: Caritas Internationalis, which regroups catholic NGOs for humanitarian help and development from the entire world or the Global Union Federation which seeks to build an international cooperation between major national unions). In terms of raw capacity (i.e. by simply adding up the capacity of each individual member-CSO) they have important financial and human resources. However, their real impact is much weaker than their raw capacity. Indeed, these organizations are federations, which means that their cooperation is limited: they do not share their resources and stay primarily independent organizations. The purpose of these federations is only to put in common some resources to achieve common goals. Moreover, these organizations are characterized by a large diversity of members (either because they come from different countries and have a different culture and vision, or because they intervene in different fields). This involves coordination problems and a lack of efficiency or coherence because a global consensus is often hard to reach. Because of these internal differences, their sustainability is also quite fragile, as internal struggles can rapidly lead to the dissolution of the federation. CSO federations can nevertheless be temporarily particularly efficient, when they conduct a very united action on a very specific and polemic subject20. These organizations are also very efficient for bringing national or regional concerns to the international agenda.

On some rare occasions, the civil society can also be suddenly united and act as a bloc to lead some specific actions. This is what we call thematic coalitions. In this case, CSOs which do not usually work together temporarily forget their differences and take part of a global movement. This was, for instance, the case of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) which took place in 1993 or the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP) in 2005. Thematic coalitions involve a broad range of actors, including small local CSOs (from the South and the North) but also larger organizations such as INGOs. Thematic coalitions often use their important media coverage and the potential weight they represent in terms of capacity (even if, as in the case of CSO federations, it is

20 Examples are listed in D’Orfeuil Henri Rouillé (2006) La Diplomatie Non Gouvernementale : Les ONG peuvent-elles changer le Monde ?
nonsense to add up their individual financial and human resources). However, the fact that they represent a large part of the civil society gives them an important weight in global negotiations with governments or international institutions. These movements stay nevertheless punctual and occasional. When the specific goal of the thematic coalition is reached or if the punctual global activism slows down, CSOs which have taken part in the thematic coalition leave it as fast as they have joined it.

Some small specific CSOs can also have a sizable influence on global issues. This is the case of expert groups or think tank. These are small but very specialized CSOs, composed of scientist or highly skilled people in some very technical fields (ex: finance, IT, biotechnology, climatology, nuclear technology, state of the art technology etc.). Finance Watch\textsuperscript{21} or Vivagora\textsuperscript{22} are examples of such organizations. In terms of capacity, these organizations are quite weak compared to other global civil society actors. However, their impact can be very important because governments, international institutions or even TNCs listen very carefully to their claims. Indeed, these organizations, because they are recognized for their scientific or technical knowledge, are seen as legitimate actors when an issue related to their field of intervention is raised. In some cases, they are even summoned by international institutions to participate to the policy making process as their expertise is needed.

To finish, one does not have to forget that the definition of CSOs is not very exclusive. That is why we identify a last type of civil actor acting at a global level which includes civil organizations which are linked with businesses or governmental interests. Most of time, these organizations are officially registered as civil organizations however their close relationship with a given government or industry makes them very difficult to classify as they are hybrid organizations. Nevertheless, they have a clear influence on global issues and international institutions. Business International Non-Governmental Organizations (BINGOs) and Government Oriented Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs) are examples of such organizations. These organizations are quite controversial. On one hand, they could represent opportunities, especially in regions where civil movements and CSOs are not well implanted (ex: In China, where GONGOs have encouraged some civil movements, especially in the fields of well-being and labor rights – Jie, 2009). But on the other hand, they represent an important threat for the future of global CSOs, especially regarding their accountability and the transparence of the civil society sector. Indeed, if such organizations would develop themselves in the future, it could become very difficult to distinguish civil claims and interests from business lobbies or organizations defending the interests of a given State.

B. The frame of intervention of CSOs in the United Nations and the European Union

The United Nations is most certainly the international organization which has been historically the most open to CSOs. Since its creation in the 40s, the UN has officially recognized CSOs’ legitimacy to participate to global governance through article 71 of the UN charter. CSOs can thus officially take part to several events and debates if they are granted with the consultative status of ECOSOC (The

\textsuperscript{21}http://www.finance-watch.org/
The number of CSOs with the consultative status has rapidly grown over time: they were only 41 CSOs with such a status in 1946, about 700 in 1992 and more than 3400 in 2011. This is notably the result of the constant attempt of the UN to strengthen its legitimacy as it is not composed of any elected representatives.

The main criteria for the attribution of the consultative status are the following: “The work of the NGO must be relevant to the work of ECOSOC, it must have a transparent and democratic decision-making mechanism and a democratically adopted constitution, [...] an established headquarters with an executive officer, it must have been in existence for at least 2 years in order to apply, it should have the authority to speak for its members [and] a representative structure, it must have appropriate mechanisms for accountability, it must provide to the Committee financial statements, including contributions and other support, and expenses, direct or indirect” (UN-ECOSOC, 2010). These are relatively restrictive criteria which favor formal CSOs with a large capacity. That is why INGOs, NGO federations, thematic coalitions and expert groups are overrepresented within CSOs with the consultative status. This may be an issue concerning CSOs’ legitimacy as large and formal CSOs are mostly Northern CSOs and are often less connected to the field realities and people’s claims than smaller local CSOs.

Once a CSO has obtained the consultative status, it is allowed to “[p]rovide expert analysis on issues directly from its experience in the field, [s]erve as an early warning agent, [h]elp monitor and implement international agreements, [h]elp raise public awareness of relevant issues, [p]lay a major role in advancing United Nations goals and objectives, [and c]ontribute with essential information at organization events, [...] attend international conferences and events, [m]ake written and oral statements at these events, [o]rganize side events, [and e]nter United Nations premises” (UN-ECOSOC, 2010). CSOs have thus a significant impact on the early stages of the policy making process: they are very influential during the agenda setting phase (in fact, the UN relies heavily on CSOs during this phase because the latter have a better knowledge of the reality of the field and the needs of the population) and, to a lesser extent, during the research and analysis phase. When projects are involved in the issue discussed, CSOs often act as an intermediary to implement the policy as the UN lacks the skills and resources to do so. Again, to evaluate the efficiency of its policy and the project it has financed, the UN often ask for the expertise of field CSOs which are much more capable in this matter than UN bureaucrats. However, it is noticeable that CSOs’ power is purely consultative and that they have consequently no power at all during the policy formulation phase. Moreover, CSOs’ influence is restricted to the ECOSOC fields which include the Commission on Population and Development, the Commission for Social Development, the Commission on the Status of Women, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the Commission on Science and Technology for Development and the Commission on Sustainable Development. That is, CSOs have an impact on the Civic and Human Rights, Well-being and Living Conditions, Environment and Technology and Development and Housing fields. But, for instance, their influence is very limited when it comes to the UN council which is one of the major bodies of the UN which deals with peace, one of the central topics of the Civic and Human Rights field.

The UE, compared to the other major international institutions, is quite specific because it is primarily focused on a given region of the world. As the UN, the UE has been historically quite open to CSOs’ participation. One explanation could be the large size of the civil society sector in Western Europe and its historical cooperation with national authorities. Again, another reason for this is the need of legitimization of the UE which is, and has been, criticized for its lack of democracy. However,
as the UE is dotted with a representative body (the European parliament), the inclusion of CSOs in the policy making process is less formal than in the UN system. Indeed, the European system is much more flexible and informal and consists in the following major processes: ad hoc meetings on various social and political fields, regular consultative meetings about a specific subject (e.g., biotechnology, environmental issues) and public online consultation through bill publication on the Internet. Thus, as it is less demanding in terms of formal guarantees and allows the participation of almost whoever wants to, the UE reaches a larger range of CSOs, including smaller and less formal ones. Here, networking, flexibility and cross sector cooperation is more important to have an impact on the policy making process than pure financial and human capacity. This should, at some point, play in favor of CSOs’ legitimacy as smaller, closer to the field and people’s concerns CSOs are allowed to participate to the debate if they feel concerned. On the other hand, the lack of formality may be a threat to the sustainability of CSOs’ influence on the EU, as there are no formal guarantees for the future, allowing the EU to change its relationship with CSOs more easily than in the case of the UN.

C. CSOs and the international development strategy

Global development strategies today involve a wide range of issues and are characterized by more and more interconnected and cross field projects and debates which involve a wide range of actors: poverty fighting, energy issues, climate change, agricultural issues, water supply and sanitation, education and capacity building, housing and infrastructure, access to banking services etc. This is reflected by the increasing cooperation of international institutions, such as the IMF, the WB, the WTO and the UN regarding global development issues. One example of this cross-sectorial cooperation is the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) which aim at coordinating international development aid in a global strategy. It involves a broad range of actors, including the UN, the World Bank, donor states and more recently the IMF and the WTO concerning financial and trade issues; plus, of course, CSOs. However, the latter, which have a more long term view, are already thinking about the “post MDG’s”.

The current global development strategy is characterized by two trends. First, the global development strategy is no longer exclusively in the hand of Northern countries. The last decades have witnessed the raise of so called “new” actors in international development: China, India, Brazil and at a regional level Mexico, Chile, Columbia, South Africa, Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia and Vietnam. The emergence of these new actors has been strengthened by the 2007-2008 financial crisis which has particularly affected Northern economies (Lundsgaarde, 2011). Second, the last decades have been characterized by an increasing recognition and incorporation of CSOs in global development policies. This is especially true in the case of the IMF, the WB and the WTO where CSOs have been more or less ignored during a long time. Indeed, these international institutions embraced the Washington Consensus until the early 2000s when they started to change radically their approach. Especially during the 80s and the Reagan years, the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO were the faithful representatives of neo-liberal theories: market liberalization, free trade, withdrawal of the state and suppression of public services have been their priorities, especially in the case of the implementation of the so-called structural adjustment policies (Dezalay & Garth, 1998). During this time, these international institutions have been particularly closed to CSOs. However, the break-up of the Washington Consensus which has occurred in the late 1990’s has radically changed the
situation. The WB, notably under the influence of J. E. Stiglitz, has started an important movement of cooperation with the civil society and has radically changed its approach during the last decade, which is notably reflected in the 2007 annual report of the WB. Even the IMF and the WTO have begun to include CSOs in their policy making process, even if to a much lesser extent. The tendency is nevertheless very clear and seems inevitable: CSOs are to be increasingly influential in the policy making process of international institutions.

1. CSOs’ relationship with the World Bank

The World Bank (WB) was created in 1945 but it had almost no relationship with CSOs until the 1980s. The cooperation between CSOs and the WB has ironically begun in the early 1980s as the latter started to accord its lending under certain conditions, including the privatization of public services, in the frame of the Washington Consensus. Thus, service provision CSOs were used by the WB as private partners to implement social services in poor countries. However, this also opened the door to social and environmental advocacy CSOs (particularly women right, labor and ecological CSOs) which took advantage of this new space to influence the WB’s policy. Even if the contribution of CSOs and their real impact on the WB’s decisions were often very weak, they managed to implement a relatively strong culture of WB-CSO partnership in the institution by the 2000s which eventually led to the progressive opening of the WB to CSOs, especially after the radical shift of the break-up of the Washington Consensus.

First CSOs played a significant role in the major shift of paradigm in the WB which occurred in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, i.e. the break-up of the Washington Consensus. In particular, CSOs have considerably influenced the transparency, the accountability and WB’s practices, and have especially participated to the resignation of WB President Paul Wolfowitz in 2007 (Edwards, 2009). Indeed, in the mid 2000s, as the WB had faced several accusations of corruption and misbehaviors, a legal CSO named “Government Accountability Project” (GAP) has been consulted to implement a whistleblower policy (i.e. an employee who denounces misbehaviors from a hierarchical superior) protection policy. Although GAP was unable to implement an efficient formal procedure regarding this issue, due to reluctances of the General Counsel’s office, it strengthened the culture of consulting CSOs among WB staff. Besides, several CSOs have exerted external pressures on the WB to encourage the reformation of its practices. In addition with the press, CSOs have created blogs where they denounced misbehaviors and bad practices of the WB (for instance, the blog “Wolfowitz Resign” created by the CSO “50 Years is Enough” and “World Bank President” influenced by The Bretton Woods Project and IFIWatch). In order to be more efficient, CSOs have eventually formed a coalition composed of GAP, a broad cross section of WB staff, blogging CSOs, CSOs involved in several WB projects (notably environmental, labor and women rights CSOs) and various press contacts. After the resignation of Paul Wolfowitz, CSOs have advocated for deeper formal cooperation between the civil society sector and the WB and for a better accountability of the Bank, resulting in the adoption of a proper whistleblower protection policy in June 2008.

But CSOs have not only influenced the reformation of the WB but have also been increasingly involved in the WB’s policies. This movement has begun in the early 1980s, but has become especially clear since the 2000s and the break-up of the Washington Consensus.
First of all, CSOs have attended to more and more meetings with the WB. For instance, CSOs are now invited every year to a “spring meeting” co-organized by the WB and the IMF. In 2009, about 300 CSO representatives attended to this meeting, which represented a 37 percent increase over the previous year. Since 2008, in response to the food crisis which began in 2007 and later on the financial crisis and its consequences, the WB initiated a series of roundtables with CSOs to discuss of these issues. Again, the IMF and the UN were more or less involved as the IMF and UNICEF presidents have also taken part to these roundtables. WB staff members have also attended to more and more global CSO meetings, such as the World Social Forum and CIVICUS Global Assemblies. The WB has also got closer to several national CSO networks, especially in developing countries such as Brazil, India, Nigeria, The Philippines and Tajikistan. The WB has also strengthened its relations with CSOs regarding several development issues, including urban water and sanitation, accountability and transparency and odious debt. All this has helped to normalize WB-CSO relations and has built natural and sustainable discussions between the WB and CSOs.

Moreover, there are more and more operational cooperation between the WB and CSOs. The expertise, the experience and the competences of CSO workforce are needed by the WB when it comes to agenda setting, discussing field operations, implementing and evaluating policies. For instance, the WB has asked CSOs for their technical expertise regarding development and agricultural issues in developing countries through a series of workshops, regional and global meetings since 2006. Between 2005 and 2007, the WB also participated in the Clean Energy Investment Framework, which aimed at increasing energy supply in Southern countries (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa), lower carbon intensity of growth and help Southern countries to adapt to climate change. CSOs from various countries, including developing countries, were regularly consulted regarding field issues during this period. The disclosure consultation process, launched in March 2009, consisted in consulting legal CSOs in about 25 countries in order to improve WB’s transparency and accountability. All these examples show that CSOs are increasingly consulted by the WB and have a growing influence on WB’s global policy. On a regional, national and local level, CSOs have also taken part in WB’s activities, especially in the “Country Assistance” and “Poverty Reduction” fields. This has included consultations, information sharing, research work, monitoring and evaluation. As shown in figure 8.1 below, there has been an increasing involvement of CSOs in WB projects in the last 20 years. Today, CSOs are involved in about 70 percent of WB projects.
Beyond the quantitative growth of CSOs’ involvement, there has also been a qualitative enhancement of CSOs’ cooperation with the WB. Indeed, CSOs were first only consulted in the early phases of the policy making process (i.e. agenda setting, research and analysis phases). But today, they are also involved in the late phases, including planning, design and appraisal of projects. Moreover, the fields where CSOs intervene are more and more diversified: community-driven development projects (i.e. empowerment projects where poor people are at the core of decision making), the “Development Marketplace” program (which aims at financing innovative Southern entrepreneurs’ projects which have an important socio-economical impact), the “Global Environment Facility” which grants funding to sustainable development projects and several other environmental projects (especially in Asia, Africa and South America), the Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program for Africa, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Fund, training and capacity building projects (notably in Africa) etc. (World Bank-Civil Society Team, 2009).

The World Bank, which has been historically relatively closed to CSOs’ participation, notably when it was still very influenced by the Washington Consensus, is thus today increasingly involving CSOs in its policy making process. The radical transformation which occurred in the early 2000s with the break-up of the Washington Consensus has been accompanied by a boom in CSO-WB cooperation. Today, civil society actors participate to the internal enhancement of the WB (accountability, transparency etc.) through external pressures and close cooperation of legal CSOs. But they are also close operational partners in various fields and projects as they participate to the elaboration of the WB’s policies at various phases of the policy making process. Even if the CSO-WB relationship cannot be compared to the CSO-UN relationship, the latter becomes more and more formal and common and cooperation is expected to increase both quantitatively and qualitatively in the future.
2. CSOs and global financial regulation

Financial regulation has long been exclusively managed by sovereign states, at a national level. But as financial markets have become globalized, this issue is now a global one. As a consequence, global financial regulation is now in the hand of intergovernmental meetings (such as the G20) and of the International Monetary Fund.

As we have seen before, the civil society financial sector is very weak and still in an emergent phase. But the 2007-2008 financial crisis has democratized financial issues as people have realized that financial markets and their regulation can have an important impact on the real economy, including employment and its related social issues, distribution of wealth, taxes, environmental incentives etc. Global financial regulation, which was once seen as a technical subject involving only banks, TNCs and governments, is now becoming a global issue involving the civil society as well.

We will not mention the G20 in this part because we assume that CSOs’ influence on the G20 is basically reflected by their impact on a national level – which we have already studied in the first part of this paper. Our focus will thus be on the relationship between CSOs and the IMF.

As the World Bank, the IMF was historically very reluctant to the participation of CSOs in its policy making process. This has been all the more encouraged by the virtual inexistence of financial CSOs until recent times. The first timid relations with CSOs were engaged in the 1980s but the real shift has occurred in the 2000s. The growing inclusion of CSOs in the IMF policy making process has followed the slow reformation of the Fund and the evolution of its policies - and, of course, has been very influenced by the break-up of the Washington Consensus in the early 2000s. However, IMF-CSO relationships today are still in an early phase, even if the IMF has officially recognized the need of cooperating with CSOs since the late 1990s and such practices are encouraged within the Fund.

This has been the consequence of the growing awareness of the IMF which has realized, especially since the 2000s, that cooperation with CSOs was needed (i.e. pull factors). CSOs are the indispensable link between the IMF and the population. By opening itself to CSOs, the IMF is making itself more transparent: people have a better understanding of its policies, actions and missions. Besides, by listening to CSOs recommendations and claims, the IMF has a good idea of the public perception and acceptance of its policies which allows it to reconsider or reformulate the latter. These are essential tools regarding the IMF’s legitimacy and political viability.

Moreover, the IMF has realized in the last decades that CSOs are dotted with specific knowledge, expertise and competences which are indispensable for the IMF to fulfill its missions. These acknowledgements and the will of the IMF to extend its relations with CSOs are reflected in the “Guide for Staff Relation with Civil Society Organizations” which has been distributed to IMF employees in 2003. In this guide, IMF staff members are encouraged to cooperate with CSOs, although it is stated that relations with governments stay the priority. The guide attaches a high importance to the diversity of CSO partners and the fact that cooperation has to be meaningful (i.e. the timing of the consultation must allow CSOs to be able to influence the concerned policy, a real strategy has to be built around these consultations, a precise agenda has to be set in advance, IMF staff have to be briefed about the CSOs they will meet etc.). This underlines the fact that cooperating with CSOs is not only a marketing strategy but that there is a real will of the IMF to take advantage of its new relationship with the civil society sector.

However, CSOs’ influence on IMF’s decisions and policies is still very limited, especially when it comes to technical issues regarding financial regulation, where states, TNCs and banking groups are seen as the most relevant actors. It is also noticeable that the IMF does not clearly differentiate BINGOs and lobbying groups from other CSOs. CSO-IMF relationships are still at an early stage and are far from being comparable with WB-CSO relations, not to mention the UN-CSO relationship. We argue nevertheless that the combination of the emergence of a civil society financial sector and of the increasing openness of the IMF to CSOs, the weight and influence of CSOs on the IMF and, more generally, on global financial regulation, is likely to increase significantly in the future.

3. CSOs and global trade regulation

Global trade regulation involves a wide range of issues: farmer and labor right issues, employment issues, development issues (especially regarding the deterioration of the terms of trade), agricultural and environmental issues (especially regarding intensive farming, transports and global division of labor), technological issues (such as technological transfers, trade related aspects of the regulation of GMOs) etc. Global trade regulation has historically been in the hand of governments which have established bilateral or multilateral trade agreement with a more or less important influence of TNCs and business lobbies. Today, global trade regulation is centralized in a single body, the WTO, where various actors, especially governments and TNCs, negotiate and interact. However, in the last decades, CSOs have gained an increasing weight in the WTO debates and negotiations, even if their influence is still very limited.

As long as the WTO was still the GATT, it had no relationship with CSOs. This is explained by the nature of the GATT, which was basically a tariff agreement, meant to serve the major commercial countries and excluding minor actors. The only non-governmental actors which have been involved were TNCs and business associations which lobbied their respective governments. The first changes have occurred in the early 1990s when the GATT began to reach new fields, especially environmental ones. Indeed, by resolving disputes such as the Tuna-Dolphin, the GATT dealt not only with purely trade-related issues but also environmental ones, where CSOs were much more active and seen as legitimate actors. A few years later, in the mid-1990s, the GATT became the WTO, becoming a “proper” international organization with much broader missions. The WTO has rapidly become much more politicized than the GATT and has drawn the attention of CSOs since this period. However, the WTO has not really encouraged close cooperation with CSOs. Actually, the WTO has formally refused direct access to its meetings and its work to CSOs. This is still the case today, especially when it comes to the dispute settlement system: “Since only WTO Member governments can bring disputes, it follows that private individuals or companies do not have direct access to the dispute settlement system, even if they may often be the ones (as exporters or importers) most directly and adversely affected by the measures allegedly violating the WTO Agreement. The same is true of other non-governmental organizations with a general interest in a matter before the dispute settlement system (which are often referred to as NGOs). They, too, cannot initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings”\textsuperscript{24}. The only major exception is a registration as observer which has been

\textsuperscript{24} WTO website : http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s4p1_e.htm#parties
created in 1996 which allows CSOs to attend Ministerial Conferences (which take place approximately every two year).

Since 1997, the WTO has also taken some initiatives to open dialog with CSOs, including symposia on specific topics (especially environment or development related) and invitation to informal meetings for some CSOs which have produced reports the WTO has judged relevant. Moreover, when it comes to dispute resolution through the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO, CSOs have theoretically a chance to intervene. Indeed, after a preliminary round of negotiations, if the parties (countries) do not find an arrangement, a small panel of experts is nominated to resolve the dispute. According to the DSB rules, the panel may be composed of government and non-government actors. However, the rules are very strict regarding the independence of panelists. Therefore, it very difficult for CSO members or any highly politicized actor to be chosen as panelist. In addition, economists or governmental actors are traditionally preferred as panelists. However, CSOs (as any other non-governmental actor, including business lobbies) can address written Amicus Curiae submissions to panelists, i.e. written unrequested statements and recommendations. Taking these Amicus Curiae into consideration is nevertheless not compulsory for the panelists and WTO staff. This is quite a controversial measure as some members are arguing that the dispute procedure is purely a matter between parties which should not involve other actors especially non-governmental ones, while others argue that the role of CSOs and public participation to the debates should be increased. All in all, it is nevertheless clear that CSOs’ range of intervention is still very limited inside the WTO.

However, following the trend of other international institutions, the WTO tends to recognize more and more the need of consulting the civil society, especially since it is criticized for its lack of democracy.

Despite the relative difficulty to influence directly the WTO, CSOs have used indirect means to have an impact on global trade regulation. Indeed, CSOs’ activism at a national level (see the first part of this note) has an indirect important impact as WTO’s policy making process basically takes the form of negotiations between member-countries. Moreover, CSOs’ work has been mainly focused outside the WTO, especially through public awareness campaigns by taking advantage of the WTO’s media coverage. As a consequence, WTO Ministerial Conferences have been marked by constant parallel demonstrations, where CSOs have been very active. Large groups of very diverse CSOs (small and large environmental CSOs, scientific groups, development CSOs, farmer rights CSOs …) have organized civil society meetings before WTO Ministerial Conferences and have built punctual coalitions to get a more coherent protest. The so called “Battle of Seattle”, which took place in 1999 during the WTO Ministerial Conference to protest against globalization and neoliberal policies of the WTO, is one famous example of this indirect activism of the civil society. The 1999 Battle of Seattle is often considered as a key date in the emergence of the alterglobalist movements and associated with the raise of CSOs in the last decades.

To illustrate how CSOs can influence the WTO, we propose the case study of the GMO trade regulations. We chose this specific case because it is a representative example of new cross-field global issues, which raise economical, social, environmental as well as technological issues: food safety, ethical issues, exports of American farmers and TNCs, consumer preferences, biodiversity, support of biotechnologies etc. The GMO case involves a broad range of actors, including governments, TNCs, farmers, consumers and CSOs.
The major conflict was between the USA and Canada on one side and the EU on the other side and has begun in the early 2000s. North American countries, which are major GMO producers, accused EU labels and strict food regulation to be trade barriers preventing North American farmer to export their products in the European market. On a WTO committee level (i.e. the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on technical Barriers to Trade) CSOs were not very influent, as direct access to the meetings was (and is still) denied to them. However, CSOs have had the opportunity to lobby in favor of consumer interests regarding GMOs during Ministerial Conferences where they have been invited. Some large CSOs with important resources, such as Greenpeace International and Consumer International have been relatively successful in setting consumer issues to the agenda of the negotiations. Besides, some other global environmental CSOs, such as Friend of the Earth International, have been very active outside the WTO during the Ministerial Conferences and have obtained significant results in terms of media coverage. The protests have been important and visible enough so that WTO decision maker could not ignore them. To finish, scientific CSOs have had the opportunity to participate to the technical and scientific debates and have been more or less successful to influence them. But the larger impact of CSOs has been at a national level, by influencing their respective governments (especially when governments take CSO representatives in their delegations) which have direct access to the negotiation tables. However, it is noticeable that business lobbies and BINGOs have been very influent at the WTO committee and negotiation levels. Contrary to CSOs, they managed to get indirect access to the negotiation tables thanks to their very close relationship with some government representatives. This was for instance the case during the 1999 Seattle Ministry Committee when TNCs managed to transform their proposition of creating a Working Group of Biotechnology within the WTO, to expand the trade of biotech products and defend the interests of the biotechnology industry, into a formal request of the US delegation. Although this proposition has eventually not been adopted, this shows the relative facility for TNCs to access to the negotiation tables compared to CSOs.

At a judiciary level, i.e. in the frame of the DSB, CSOs have also few opportunities to influence the panelists. In the GMO case, CSO adopted three different strategies: several Amicus Curiae have been addressed to the panelists, petitions have been signed and addressed to the WTO, awareness campaigns have been led, and scientific CSOs have led counter expertise. However, again, the impact of these actions has been relatively weak: the petition never reached the head of the WTO, panelists have been rather influenced by business lobbies than by CSOs and confrontation with counter expertise has not been very successful because of a lack of coordination (Steffek, 2005).

In the GMO case, the most influent actions led by CSOs have taken place outside the WTO, which is representative of the general trend of WTO-CSO relationships. Indeed, CSOs participated to independent regional workshops (where regional issues regarding GMOs have been discussed) where they had the opportunity to interact directly with WTO policy-makers. Besides, some CSO or CSO coalition participated to informal meetings with WTO administrative staff and public symposia. However, one has to keep in mind that the WTO Secretariat’s role in the WTO policy making process is limited, as the latter do not participate to inter-governmental negotiations.

As reflected in the GMO case, the WTO remains relatively closed to CSOs. It stays primarily a negotiation and conflict resolution body for countries. Therefore, CSOs’ most important influence on global trade regulation takes place earlier, at the national level by influencing governments or regional international institutions such as the UE. The only non-state actors which seem to have
some noticeable direct influence on the WTO are TNCs and business lobbies, because of their proximity with some government representatives. Nevertheless, tremendous progress has been made compared to the former GATT: the WTO now officially recognizes the role of CSOs in global trade governance and has established some guideline to WTO-CSO relationships (even if the latter are very limited). Moreover, the civil society becomes more and more organized and in the last decade several activism and attempts to influence the WTO’s agenda have been witnessed, especially since issues discussed at the WTO have extended beyond purely economical and trade issues (such as in the GMO case). The WTO becomes more and more transparent as almost all its reports are made public, which allows CSOs to be informed of the WTO policy and to react. Under the external pressure of CSOs, its lack of democracy which is often criticized, the development of CSOs and their will to influence global trade regulation, the tendency is clearly to an increase of CSO-WTO cooperation (both quantitatively and qualitatively) and to a progressive formal opening of the WTO to CSOs as observers and partners in the future.

D. CSOs’ role in the adoption of corporate social responsibility by transnational companies

Global governance and the global development strategy do not only involve states and international institutions but also private business actors: Transnational Companies (TNCs). In the last decades, the number and the power of TNCs has increased, making it an inevitable actor of the globalized economy but also in several social and environmental fields, including labor rights and working conditions, employment, pollution and sustainable development, technology transfers and development etc. TNCs’ behavior is, of course, regulated at a national level by governments through specific rules and regulations. By acting at a national level, CSOs can thus influence TNCs’ behavior. However, national rules and regulation vary tremendously from one country to another, with the existence of tax heavens or countries where environmental and social legislation is very poor, allowing TNCs to get away from rigorous governance. In response to this failure to regulate TNCs’ activities, a new concept has emerged in these last decades: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). This notion underlines that “companies are responsible not just to their shareholders, but to other stakeholders (workers, suppliers, environmentalists, communities, etc.)” (Guay, Doh and Sinclair, 2004). CSR has changed through time and varies depending on the type of capitalism and the sector which is concerned (Petit & Capron). But generally speaking, it takes the form of a set of rules and specific behaviors which companies impose to themselves, i.e. codes of conducts. CSOs are a major actor in the process of forcing TNCs to adopt CSR and sign such codes of conducts. CSOs basically use five different strategies to influence TNCs’ behavior and develop CSR: media campaign to denounce misbehaviors (name and shame strategy), advocacy toward institutional investors and pension funds, advice and information to Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds, shareholder activism and sponsorship of SRI funds.

First, the most obvious way to influence TNCs for CSOs is to use their media coverage. Indeed, as these companies are well-known throughout the world and often posses a very strong image or brand, they are very vulnerable to the deterioration of their image. This is called the “name and shame” strategy. Most of the time, managers find it wiser to adapt costly CSR measures rather than damaging the company’s image, which is most of the time even costlier. CSOs use the new
communication technologies to spread misbehaviors of TNCs rapidly and at low costs. Greenpeace International, for instance, is well-known for its media campaigns and denouncement of anti-environmental behaviors of TNCs, but there are many other examples of such actions in various fields, including the famous Public Eye Hall of Shame which “awards” the worst TNCs of the year. In some cases, TNC managers even try to implement preventive CSR practices because they fear the consequences of a possible scandal in the future. CSOs’ role is also very important as they watch TNCs which have signed codes of conduct and CSR charts to force companies to respect their engagements.

Of course, even if CSOs’ media campaigns and public denouncement of misbehaviors have led to several behavioral changes of numerous TNCs, these actions present important limits. First of all, TNCs which are focused on Business to Business (B to B) and less visible activities are much less exposed to this type of action, because they are not in direct contact with final consumers. Moreover, the effects of such media campaigns are very limited in time and do not have long term impact on TNC’s image and profits which makes them sometimes relatively inefficient. To finish, TNCs often use their resources to launch counter-media campaigns to restore their image, or adopt techniques of “greenwashing” through superficial but very visible measures or soft (i.e. non verifiable) information diffusion. This is a key issue, especially since hard (i.e. verifiable) information is very costly to produce which leads to an incentive to make greenwashing instead of proper CSR. CSOs are thus a key actor for the future of CSR as they could be a major producer of such hard information which would encourage firms to implement CSR and avoid greenwashing (Vauday & Bazillier, 2012).

Second, CSOs can also influence TNCs’ behaviors by advocating institutional investors, especially pension funds. Indeed, convincing pension fund shareholders to withdraw from a company or threaten to do so is an excellent mean to force TNCs to adopt CSR policies. The Talisman Energy (a Canadian oil company) case is a good example of this phenomenon. In the late 1990s, this company was implanted in Sudan and accused of disrespecting several basic human and labor rights principles. As Talisman Energy ignored The Taskforce on Churches and Corporate Responsibility’s (a Canadian CSO) demand of adopting basic ethical measures to provide acceptable working conditions to its employees, the CSO led an awareness campaign to sensitize shareholders. It gained the support of several institutional investors, including the pension funds of Ontario teachers and municipal employees and Quebec which eventually led Talisman Energy to stop its activity in Sudan and adopt ethical measures. This innovative way to influence TNCs is likely to develop in the future, especially if institutional investors sensitive to social and environmental issues (such as pension funds) develop, which is not unlikely.

Third, CSOs’ expertise is highly demanded by Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds. These funds, which invest in companies which match certain criteria (ethical, social, ecological etc.), need independent bodies specialized in these questions to evaluate and watch companies in which they are investing. CSOs are thus at the center of the development of SRI funds by providing them information and their expertise. The development of SRI funds may accompany the growth of the civil society financial sector. Supporting responsible and sustainable finance by providing

25 In 2012, the top 6 “winners” were Vale, Tepco, Samsung, Barclays, Syngenta and Freeport: http://www.publiceye.ch/fr/classement/
independent and reliable information regarding social and environmental performances of TNCs is one of the core missions of CSOs and is likely to increase in the future.

Another way of influencing TNCs’ policies is simply to enter into their capital by buying shares. This type of action is only accessible for CSOs with sufficient financial resources to buy a minimum number of shares to be able to lead basic actions at shareholder meetings and to company boards. However, because in this case CSOs are both shareholder and stake holder, they may have a disproportionate influence regarding the number of shares they own (Guay, 2004). One example of such shareholder activism is that of Friend of the Earth which entered the capital of Exxon in the 1990s. By a combination of intern shareholder activism and external awareness campaigns and demonstrations, the CSO forced Exxon to adopt better safety procedures and environmental measures. This type of action is however quite uncommon because it is limited by the lack of financial resources of the civil society sector.

To finish, CSOs can influence CSR by sponsoring their own SRI funds. This action actually follows the spirit of shareholder activism although it suppresses the problem of financial resources. Indeed, by doing so, CSO drain private savings which are then invested in selected companies with high social and/or environmental performances. This movement is quite recent and has started at the beginning of the 21th century as the “Humane Equity Fund” has been created in 2000 by the CSO “Humane Society of the United States”. Some other have followed, such as the environmental CSO “Sierra Club” which has founded the Sierra Club Balanced Fund in 2003, specialized in investment in companies with high environmental performances.

We have thus seen that CSOs have not only an impact at a national and regional level but also at a global level. If there is an obvious link between CSO’s impact and structure at a national and global level, the latter is not a direct transposition of CSO’s weight on a national level. First of all, the main governance topics at a global level are not the same than the one at a national level. Second, civil society actors at a global level are not always the same than the one acting at a national level. To finish, the actors CSOs are working with or fighting against at a global level are not the same than the one at a national level. That is why we keep this geographical separation in our prospective analysis. Thanks to the retrospective analysis we have conducted in the first part of this paper, we have made a broad picture of the weight and structure of CSOs at a national level, which allowed us to classify countries according to a set of typologies. This will be the first axis of our prospective analysis. In the second part of this paper, we identified the main field of intervention of CSOs at a global scale and the main actors with which they interact. This will be our second axis of analysis to study the possible futures and main trends of the weight and impact of the civil society sector.
IV. Prospective view through scenarios

After having briefly described the main trends of CSO’s role and structure in national and global governance, we will try to study the possible evolution of the latter according to the four main AUGUR scenarios.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main AUGUR scenarios</th>
<th>Reduced Government</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>Focus on budget consolidation, especially in developed countries. Domination of markets, liberalization and transnational companies.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China and US Intervention</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important intervention of the Chinese and the US governments to regulate global markets. Relative withdrawal of the rest of the world from the international scene, including Europe and other BRICs.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Regionalisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional integration and intra-zone intervention around three major blocs: North America centered around the USA, Europe centered around the UE and Eastern Asia centered around China.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Multipolar Collaboration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International and multilateral cooperation is established to tackle down poverty, financial and environmental global issues.</td>
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</table>

Insert (Cripps, AUGUR 2012)

“The first global scenario, "Reduced government", is the most pessimistic as it assumes market forces will have a pervasive and increasing influence worldwide while governments, especially those in high income regions, are unable to intervene with sufficient force to change the trends that result [...]..

Remaining global scenarios assume more effective action by governments to adjust market behaviour. The "China and US intervention" scenario generates significant improvements for the two super-powers and their closest neighbours but leaves Europe depressed with limited trade opportunities and little capability for lifting financial constraints.

The "Regionalisation" scenario represents a more significant and extensive break with recent trends on the assumption that problems arising from continuing globalisation of business and markets.

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26 http://www.augurproject.eu/
oblige national governments in each part of the world to undertake important new initiatives at the regional level. In Europe this is taken to mean active management of financial institutions and government bodies and increased concertation or regulation of corporations with the objective of overcoming debt problems and restarting programs to reduce internal disparities that had been followed in previous decades. The scenario assumes that more integrated and effective financial and economic management in Europe is mirrored by similar schemes for regional integration in North America and East Asia and, although with less effect, in the rest of Asia, Africa and South America. The outcome of this scenario is a substantial improvement in growth prospects in all parts of the world with substantial gains in Europe even if the institutional framework of the European Union is not radically changed [...].

The last scenario, "Multipolar cooperation", takes regionalisation one step further by introducing effective cooperation between world regions to deal with major problems affecting the world as a whole. Among the assumed objectives of global cooperation are limitation of financial imbalances, faster growth of per capita income in the South, reduced energy dependence and stabilisation or if possible reduction of carbon emissions. This scenario illustrates conditions under which it may in principle be possible for the world community to make simultaneous progress with respect to three long-term global objectives - economic security, reduced inequality and sustainability. This program would require substantial changes in political systems and new developments in institutions at the global and regional level as well as important adjustments of policy norms and the regulatory framework for commercial and financial institutions.” (Cripps, 2012)

Our focus will be on:

- The evolution of the capacity, the sustainability and the impact of CSOs at a regional and global level;
- The evolution of the regional typologies (country clusters) we have identified in the first part of this note;
- The ability of CSOs to diffuse in developing countries;
- The ability of CSOs to cooperate at an international level, especially regarding transversal issues;
- The development of the “new” fields of intervention of CSOs (Environment & Technology and Finance).

Some deep rooted trends:

We believe that some assumptions are valid for the four scenarios as they are deep rooted trends which are not likely to be influenced by macro-economical and political factors. Thus, we assume that the capacity of CSOs will continue to grow (though at different rates given the different assumptions of the scenarios) especially thanks to the diffusion of the Internet allowing cheap and easy communication encouraging the rise of civil organizations and popular movements. In particular, we assume that new forms of ad hoc citizen’s movements based on blogging and web networks (ex: Anonymous27, the Arab Spring movements) will develop, making grassroots civil movements much less controllable than before. Second, we assume that the major international

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27 Anonymous is an activist group defending freedom of speech, especially in the Internet. They are well known for having conducted hacking attacks against governments or organizations they judged were against basic liberties.
institutions will follow the current trend by engaging further cooperation with CSOs in the future. Some political factors may indeed encourage or slow down this trend but we assume that as the role of CSOs as an actor in global governance has been recognized by a growing number of scholars and international institutions, it is not likely that the latter will shift to their former paradigm and that cooperation with CSOs will decrease. Therefore, we assume that efforts will be made by CSOs to develop certification procedures and accountability practices following the current trend, especially by large CSO organizations (INGOs and CSO federations) since they have the largest resources, the largest media exposure and such accountability procedures will be required by international institutions to be allowed to participate in their policy making process.
Table 4.1: Summary of our main assumptions for the four scenarios

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Joining up with the Liberal model (focus on immediate social needs – health, housing, unemployment etc.)</td>
<td>Development of the Well-being &amp; Living Conditions, Civic and Labor Rights sectors</td>
<td>Growth of international development help (with a high risk of clientelism)</td>
<td>Strengthening of the Liberal path: privatization of public services delegated to CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North and Central America</td>
<td>Development of local/alternative currencies, especially in South Europe</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North, West and South Europe</td>
<td>Strengthening of unions against austerity</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia and CIS</td>
<td>Social movements regarding civic and human rights Whether it will be sufficient to reform the political structure and enhance democracy remains uncertain</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
<td>Strengthening of the Welfare Partnership: social harmonization through close cooperation of CSOs and public authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Europe</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Stagnation of the civil society sector</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
<td>Same than in S1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 1: Reduced Government</td>
<td>Scenario 2: China and US intervention</td>
<td>Scenario 3: Regionalisation</td>
<td>Scenario 4: Multipolar Collaboration</td>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| China                         | Strategy of domestic refocus leads to the development of labor rights and social welfare CSOs  
Emergence of an environmental CSO sector (mainly local, i.e. water and air pollution)  
Very specific structure of the civil society sector based on GONGOs | Development of the Well-being & Living Conditions, Civic and Labor Rights sectors  
Growth of international development help (with a high risk of clientelism)  
Very specific structure of the civil society sector based on GONGOs | Focus on domestic markets: CSOs are at the core of the enhancement of living conditions, civic and labor rights |
| East Asia high income         | Civil society sector structured by GONGOs  
Slow emergence of a community-based civil society sector in the Well-being & Living conditions, Labor and Human rights sectors | | |
| India                         | Rise of empowerment CSOs to help poor people (including women) to benefit from economical growth and reduce income inequalities  
Emergence of an environmental CSO sector (mainly local, i.e. water and air pollution) | | |
| Brazil (and South America)    | Religious Education CSOs stay dominant  
Strong culture and recreation CSO sector  
Community-based labor rights, empowerment and human right CSOs will slowly emerge | | |
| Lesser developed              | Contraction of the civil society sector through cuts in public and private North-South transfers  
Boost of Development & Housing CSOs thanks to Chinese and American funding  
In counterpart, high risk of clientelism | Between S1 and S2  
Clientelism less important than in S2, even if this phenomenon will persist at some level as the three major blocs will try to expand their influence | Cooperation of CSOs with states and international institutions to tackle down poverty and reach the MDGs |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major fields of intervention (global level)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scenario 1: Reduced Government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-Being and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization of public services: CSOs take the place of the withdrawn welfare states in developed countries with more or less success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low in developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher than in S1 but high risk of clientelism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scenario 2: China and US intervention</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economical imperatives overcome the precautionary principle and climate change issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak impact because of the technological race between the USA and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scenario 3: Regionalisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent confrontation between markets/TNCs and a raising financial civil society sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak impact: financial regulation is in the hand of the US and Chinese governments (“G2”) and responds to their interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scenario 4: Multiploar Collaboration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong impact on a regional level in the three main blocks: focus on intra-zone harmonization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite low in lesser developed countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong impact on a global level: CSOs participate actively to the fulfillment of the MDGs (and the post MDGs) by cooperating with reformed BWIs and the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong impact: CSOs participate actively to the elaboration of a global environmental strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important role: change people’s values, accompany the shift of paradigm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk: raise of pro-consumption/pro-growth CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium impact: regional intervention but difficulties to reach a global consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong impact: CSOs participate actively to global financial regulation through cooperation with reformed IMF and WTO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Reduced Government scenario

In this scenario, governments, especially in developed countries, focus on budget consolidation. This results in a relative withdrawal from the welfare state, especially in Western Europe, and a strengthening of markets and liberalization.

This means that in developed countries (the Liberal, Welfare Partnership and Social Democratic clusters) the structure of the civil society will catch up with the Liberal model. Indeed, government support will be weaker because of budgetary restrictions. In Liberal and Social Democratic countries, this decrease in government funding will not have a strong impact because the latter is already low. That is, in these countries, CSOs will continue to develop, following their respective model. However, this will have a tremendous impact on the sustainability of Western European CSOs. Indeed, government funding accounts, on average, for more than half of total revenue of CSOs in these countries. The European Welfare Partnership model will be greatly challenged. Western European CSOs will have to adapt and find new financing sources. This will much likely result in a less important paid workforce (i.e. layoffs in the civil society sector) and a higher reliance on volunteering. The capacity, as well as the sustainability of Western European CSOs will be affected. It is likely that some fragile CSOs will have to lower their goals and some, which are already facing financial troubles, may even disappear.

The global capacity of CSOs in developed countries will however increase, even in Europe. Indeed, the transformation of the European Welfare Partnership model into a more liberal model and its possible repercussions on the capacity and sustainability of CSOs will not be sufficient to compensate the global trend of the development of the civil society sector. Moreover, the Liberal model also encourages the development of the civil society sector, though differently than in the Western European Partnership model. Actually, the economical stagnation which developed countries will face in this scenario may reinforce the development of CSO’s capacities. As a growing number of people will be in need of social services while the state will be withdrawing from these activities, especially by withdrawing from public services and public ownership (Bance, AUGUR 2012) most countries will certainly follow the Liberal model, where a powerful civil society sector has developed to respond to this need. As often in hard economical times, solidarity at a local and national level will increase: more people will give a part of their free time by volunteering in CSOs to help their fellow citizens. However, this development will be restrained to certain fields of intervention: development & housing and well-being & living conditions (which are the two major sectors in the Liberal typology of CSOs). In a context of low resources and economic stagnation, it is likely that CSO’s efforts will be focused on immediate social needs.

However, this does not mean an enhancement of well-being. Indeed, the development of CSOs will be a response to the withdrawal of the welfare state and will thus replace former public services rather than provide additional welfare services. The literature is quite mitigated regarding the effectiveness of CSOs as provider of welfare services compared to public services, especially since there are few empirical data available regarding this issue. Nevertheless, following the view of Salamon et al., we assume that CSOs which provide welfare services may be an effective solution when cooperating with public authorities but that their primary role is not to replace the State28. In the case of a rapid withdrawal of the welfare state we assume that the development of the well-

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28 See JJD) CSOs and Welfare State: complementarity or substitution p.9
being civil society sector will help to limit the negative impact of such a withdrawal but will not be sufficient to replace efficiently former public services (especially those which are primarily linked to general interest missions including education, health and pension schemes).

It is likely that in a period of economical distress and austerity, there will be a development of alternative and non-monetary currencies. Besides, in the case of a break-up of the Euro-zone, it is possible that some local currencies will be implemented in countries facing important financial troubles such as Greece and, to a lesser extent, Portugal, Spain or even Italy.

As for the environmental civil society sector, the latter will greatly suffer from the macro-economic situation in developed countries, as long-term ecological imperatives will be relegated to a position of secondary importance. Environmental CSOs will have great difficulties to bring ecological issues to the agenda as politics and public authorities will focus on consolidation while people will be primarily concerned by economical and social issues (including unemployment and pension schemes). In countries with strong unions or a historical disposition to social demonstrations, the combination of economical difficulties and the withdrawal of the welfare state will much likely lead to a strong activism in this field. Membership in unions will not increase significantly but there will be an increase in the number of people joining demonstrations and popular claims, which will increase the capacity and the impact of unions in these countries with a non negligible probability of the occurrence of violent demonstrations or even civil wars. This raises the question of the political sustainability of the Reduced Government scenario in these countries.

In developing countries, the evolution of the civil society sector will depend on regional specificities. In most of the countries from the deferred democratization country cluster, the civil society sector will most likely grow considerably, especially in the environmental, labor and human rights sectors. This is especially true in emerging countries such as China, Russia and Brazil. Indeed, these countries will not face the same economic difficulties than Western countries.

The Brazilian civil society sector, and more generally the Latin American one, will continue its former development. Community-based labor rights, empowerment and human right CSOs will slowly emerge as these countries will reach higher levels of development. This should also raise ecological concerns in Latin America, especially among the “new” middle class which is emerging: as imperative short-term economical needs will be fulfilled for more people, Latin America will witness a growing sector of environmental CSOs, especially regarding the preservation of the Amazonian forest and biodiversity (although the impact of these new CSOs in fields linked with economical interests may be very limited).

In this scenario, China will follow its current strategy of domestic refocus, i.e. the development of its domestic market and demand. This involves the development of labor rights and social welfare CSOs which will accompany the implementation of higher incomes, better working conditions, more free time to allow people to consume, urbanization, the emergence of basic social rights (healthcare insurance, pension schemes) etc. Besides, as environmental concerns are raising in China (including energy supply security), especially since the country faces huge environmental issues, Chinese environmental CSOs will grow significantly. The structure of the Chinese civil society sector will however be quite specific. Indeed, CSOs have traditionally been heavily regulated in this country and have most of the time taken the shape of government regulated NGOs (GONGOs). It is much likely that the socio-economical transformation of China from a traditional to a modern economy will be supported by active public policies, including the implementation of public services and an emerging welfare state. CSOs’ role will nevertheless be crucial as they will be the link between the people and
the state and will help to implement fair and efficient public services which respond to the needs of the population.

Although much less affected than Western countries, industrialized Asian countries (excluding China and Japan) may suffer from the economic stagnation of Western countries as their economic model is focused on exports. There are basically two possible pathways for the civil society in these countries. As these countries have traditionally placed economical growth before the development of the civil society, one consequence of the morose world economical perspectives might be the slow down of the development of CSOs in most of the countries, especially in the environmental field which is seen as a threat to economical growth. But if these countries follow the Chinese example by refocusing on their domestic markets by increasing wages and domestic consumption, some similar evolution than the Chinese civil society sector can be expected – including the development of the well-being, labor and human rights sectors through a combination of GONGOs and grassroots movements – though with less intensity.

In Russia, the civil society sector will follow the current trend of social movements regarding civic and human rights. Whether it will be sufficient to reform the political structure of the country and enhance democracy in the country remains uncertain. It is not likely that there will be a sizable growth of the environmental and financial civil society sectors in Russia especially since the recovery of the former economical and political power of the country is likely to overwhelm environmental concerns as Russia is a major producer of fossil energy.

The development of CSOs in Eastern and Central Europe is much more uncertain. Indeed, these countries have tried to catch up with the Western European socio-economical model this last decade and have become increasingly dependent on the Western European dynamism and European structural help. As a consequence, these countries will suffer from the Western European budget cuts and economical stagnation. If any development of the civil society sector is to be expected, it will take place in the development & housing and well-being & living condition fields of intervention, following the liberal model as government support to CSOs will be very weak. As in Western Europe, environmental issues will be postponed to better economic times.

In the traditional country cluster, CSOs will suffer from the budgetary restrictions and economical difficulties in Western countries. Indeed, in these countries with high poverty rates, CSOs rely heavily on international solidarity and Northern private foundations. Western countries will focus on the resolution of their own socio-economical problems which will have a negative impact on the amount of international aid. Moreover, TNCs which are important funders of private foundations will face economical difficulties and will not be as generous as they used to be. The only exception could be India where the macro-economical perspective is assumed to be quite positive in this scenario. One could imagine the emergence of a strong civil society sector, especially community-based empowerment CSOs to help poor people (including women) to benefit from economical growth and reduce income inequalities but also some environmental CSOs as a response to increasing local ecological problems (especially air, water and ground pollution).

On a global level, this scenario assumes the predominance of markets and the relative inability of governments and international institutions to regulate them efficiently. Thus, the structure and power of international institutions is not likely to change fundamentally. Liberalization and free trade will stay the focus of the international development strategy under the pressure of business lobbies
and BINGOs which will stay very strong and influent. As for that, the WTO will follow its current policy and some further liberalization will be achieved (including agriculture and services). CSOs’ integration in the major international institutions will however follow its current trend, as the major push and pull factors we have introduced previously will stay the same (especially the need for specific competences and expertise as well as legitimacy issues through the democratization of global governance).

In the development & housing, well-being & living conditions and environmental fields, CSOs will have an increasing influence, especially through the UN, the WB and the UE, where they are already relatively well established. However, concrete actions will be very limited because of the weakness of international institutions and governments toward markets. The major funders of these international institutions (i.e. developed countries) will focus on budget consolidation and will not engage themselves in major global efforts regarding the MDGs or climate change. Thus, even if CSOs will gain an increasing capacity to influence the decisions of these international institutions, the real impact will be relatively low because of the lack of involvement of national governments to participate financially to the realization of these development and environmental goals.

Concerning the major technological issues, such as nuclear energy or biotechnologies, it is likely that economical imperatives will overcome the precautionary principle. As stated before, CSOs’ effort will be focused on social and development issues and the growth of the environmental civil society sector will be limited, especially in Western countries. The market and TNCs will be able to impose their views and overcome the “Fukushima effect” because both governments and CSOs will have huge difficulties to oppose the implementation of technologies believed to create immediate wealth and provide short-term solutions to energy shortage and food supply. Indeed, in this scenario, investments in sustainable energy sources and alternative agricultural models will remain relatively low. Nuclear energy and GMOs, for instance, may appear as the cheapest and easiest short-term solutions to these problems. It is even possible that in this scenario coal will again become a major source of energy as it is very cheap.

The growing power of markets should however encourage the development of the financial civil society sector. Indeed, in a context where people will suffer from economical stagnation and public budgetary cuts, the domination and wealth of the financial sector and TNCs which, in this scenario, will continue their “business as usual”, will raise important popular discontentment. More and more people will find it unfair that markets and bankers, which are commonly believed to be responsible for the financial crisis and its consequences on the real economy, will continue to make tremendous profits while common people will have to pay for their mistakes. This scenario could be the one of the rapid development of financial CSOs and a violent confrontation between the latter and business lobbies.

Globally speaking, the capacity of the civil society sector in this scenario will grow. But this growth will be especially located in emergent countries such as China, Russia and Brazil (and to a lesser extent India). Thus, the global weight of the civil society sector will be progressively rebalanced between Western countries and emergent countries. However, CSOs will remain very weak in some developing countries, such as African and other lesser developed countries. In developed countries, the civil society sector will catch up with the Liberal model, with a refocus on development, housing and social services (except in Nordic European countries, where advocacy CSOs in the labor and human rights and environment fields will remain strong). In emerging countries, CSOs will grow particularly in the labor, civic and human rights and, to a lesser extent, environmental fields. But on
the global level, CSOs will not have an important impact on global governance because markets and business lobbies will dominate the international scene and international institutions will be weakened by a relative withdrawal of states. The only exception is the financial sector, where an important civil movement may raise from popular frustration with possible violent social movements against austerity plans and the financial world.

B. The China and US Intervention scenario

In this scenario, markets are much more regulated than in the former one (S1) through the intervention of the Chinese and the US government, which are allowed by much better economic perspectives in these countries.

As a consequence, CSOs will grow more in US and China in S2 than in S1, for two main reasons. First, as basic economical issues (unemployment, government debt, economical growth etc.) will be more or less resolved, the Chinese and American societies in general will focus on longer-term issues, such as environmental issues, civic and human rights, well-being, financial regulation etc. though only on a local level. This involves, of course, the development of the environmental and financial civil society sectors which will reflect the strengthening of these popular concerns (especially in China, since it is already quite developed in the US).

Besides, if China and the USA are in better economic conditions, their participation in international aid will increase (though with high risk of clientelism strategies). Thus, there will be a growth of the civil society sector in the development & housing and well-being & living conditions fields dealing with developing countries.

Second, as both China and the US will compete to impose their model and expand their influence, there will most likely be a particular care to the promotion of the social conditions and well-being of American and Chinese citizens, be it only for a marketing purpose. Both China and the US will try to show the world that their citizens have better working conditions, a better social condition (healthcare, pension schemes etc.), stronger community links etc. In the US, where CSOs are traditionally preferred to public ownership to provide public services (Bance, AUGUR 2012), the development of the well-being & living condition civil society sector will be encouraged. In China, the current trend of the development of government organized NGOs (GONGOs) which are essentially focused on social service provision will be reinforced together with an active public push for public services.

There will however be some sort of clientelism through international aid from the US and China to lesser developed countries. In this scenario, CSOs will thus have a stronger weight in China and the USA than in S1, but some of them will be used as marketing tools to promote the American or the Chinese model (some analogies can be made with the USA/USSR confrontation of the 20th century). There is also a non negligible risk of a violent economic confrontation (trade war, currency war etc.) between the two super powers which would overwhelm CSOs.

In the rest of the world, CSOs’ development will be less important. In Europe (Western, Nordic and Eastern), the situation will be the same than in S1. However, higher difficulties will be faced in the BRICs (except in China). Indeed, Brazil, Russia and India will suffer from their relative exclusion from the international scene. In these countries, economical and geo-political issues will much likely
overcome social, civic and environmental issues which will be seen as secondary. The focus in these countries will be the resistance against the US and Chinese hegemony and the fight to gain a place on the international scene. This could limit the expansion of the civil society sector in these countries compared to S1.

In lesser developed countries however, such as African and low income Asian countries, CSOs will be boosted (compared to S1) by higher Chinese and American international aid, as well as higher funding from Chinese and American private and business foundations. However, the counterpart will much likely be some sort of clientelism, international aid being used in this context as a geopolitical tool.

On the global scale, regulation will be stronger than in S1 through the intervention of China and the USA. Markets, TNCs and business lobbies will be weaker than in S1. Thus, international institutions will play a much smaller role as global governance will be in the hand of the two super powers. Thus, even if CSOs' implication and integration in international institution will strengthen, following a deep-rooted trend, their advocacy efforts in this context will not have important impacts.

CSO' lobbying in this scenario will be rather focused on the Chinese and US governments. One specific assumption in this scenario is that the number and the power of Chinese international CSOs (most of which being GONGOs, which means that their advocacy efforts will be coherent with the Chinese government’s interests) will increase dramatically. Contrary to S1 where global governance will be weakened by a general inaction of governments, CSOs in S2 will have the opportunity to have a real impact on global governance, including financial regulation and global development strategy as the two super powers will strongly intervene on markets.

However, CSOs’ proposition will only be supported if they are in line with US or China’s interests: it is almost inevitable that CSOs will be used, at least at some level, by the Chinese or the US government to legitimize policies which serve their interests. Nevertheless, even if this will be part of US and China’s strategy to expand their respective influence, international development programs or financial regulation initiatives will have some collateral benefits. It is much likely that CSOs will take advantage of the willingness of the US and Chinese governments to intervene at a global scale to bring issues to the agenda and to use the funding granted by the two giants.

Global and powerful civil actors, such as INGOs or CSO coalitions will strongly protest against the imperialist view of the “G2” and the inaction to stop climate change. Some of them might use US and Chinese’s exposition in order to force them to intervene. For instance, environmental CSOs could use their “name and shame” strategy on the US or Chinese governments to denounce the carbon print of their economies or their inactions regarding global warming. This is not only restricted to the environmental field: one could imagine similar strategies to improve civic rights, working conditions etc. However it is much likely that these actions will have little impact. Indeed, as in S1, CSOs will have troubles to influence significantly technological and environmental decisions, although for other reasons. Indeed, as technology is often seen as a primary source of domination, it is likely that the precautionary principle will be overcome by the technological race between China and the USA. Energy supply security and rapid growth will be the primary goals of China and the USA and they will not hesitate to develop biotechnologies, nuclear technologies, shale gas, oil sands etc. This is probably the most pessimistic scenario for environmental issues and environmental CSOs.

Regarding the financial sector, contrary to the situation in S1, markets (including financial markets) will be relatively regulated, at least in some specific fields such as monetary markets, currency exchange rates (especially the USD/Yuan one), trade regulation etc. However, this regulation will be
led by the Chinese and US interests and will not follow the view of financial CSOs which are advocating for a fairer finance. This scenario is also the worse one for the civil society financial sector: there is just enough regulation to prevent important social protests against financial markets but the regulators are basically closed to multilateral decision making and CSOs’ propositions.

This scenario is thus a very ambivalent one for CSOs. Indeed, regarding the USA and China, the S2 scenario allows the development of a stronger civil society sector than in the Reduced Government scenario, thanks to better economic perspectives and government intervention which allow to focus on long-term issues such as ecological and social ones, though only on a local level. The development of CSOs is however more limited in S2 in other BRICs countries than in S1, while the situation in Europe is unchanged. At an international level, there are some opportunities for CSOs to bring issues to the agenda as the Chinese and US government are willing to intervene. However, there is a high risk that CSOs will be used, at least at some level, as marketing tools to promote the Chinese or American models or to implement some sort of clientelism between the dominant countries and lesser developed ones. Besides, CSOs’ influence on environmental, technological and financial issues will be overwhelmed by the interests of the Chinese and the American governments.

C. The Regionalization scenario

In this scenario, public intervention is stronger than in S2. The latter retains assumptions about Chinese and US intervention, but it adds European intervention and further regional integration. Thus, the world is dominated by three powerful regional groups: a Northern American group centered on the USA including Canada, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean (but not South America which is more or less absent from the international scene), an Asian group centered on China including Japan, Korea and Asean countries and a European group centered on the EU with some level of partnership with non EU European countries, Russia and other CIS, Turkey and North African countries. Thus, the evolution of CSOs will be very different depending on the regional group concerned.

The US group will follow the Liberal path regarding CSOs. As at least some level of intra-zone social cohesion will be sought, public missions will be encouraged. But as Anglo-Saxon countries, especially the USA, are very reluctant to public ownership (Bance, AUGUR 2012), public missions will be delegated to private actors, such as service provision CSOs, especially in the well-being & living condition field (health, education, culture, social services etc.), labor rights (working condition homogenization, basic social rights etc.), civic rights (legal harmonization, basic democratic rights etc.) as well as in the development & housing field (ex: development programs for the economical adjustment of lesser developed countries of the cluster, such as Central American countries). Environmental issues will be examined more closely than in S1, but on a lesser global scale than in S2 but the focus will be on regional environmental issues, such as local pollution, forest and biodiversity preservation etc. CSOs will not be able to bring global issues such as climate change to the agenda and there will be little efforts to tackle down these issues. Thus, in the US group, CSOs will gain in capacity and sustainability but they will lose on diversity as they will be focused on specific fields. Regional integration in the US group will however much likely take the shape of a market-driven integration, i.e. liberalization of trade and financial flux. This could prevent the emergence of a strong
financial civil society sector in this region. Indeed, as economic recover will occur, popular discontent regarding bankers, the financial sector and TNCs will weaken. The combination of an intra-zone liberalization policy (i.e. a relative public inaction on a regional level to regulate financial markets) and a weaker public concern about these issues will most certainly be very damaging to the emergent financial civil society sector in the US group.

The European group will follow the Welfare Partnership path. European integration will go further regarding social cohesion. As in the US group, CSOs will be at the core of social harmonization policies. However, it is likely that Europe will follow its historical public-private partnership policy regarding public missions. In one case, Europe will continue its current path which involves the liberalization of public services and the suppression of national public monopolies while maintaining specific rules and recognizing specific public missions in some sectors (Bance, AUGUR 2011). This will mean a model of public services relatively close to the Anglo-Saxon one, where public missions will be delegated to CSOs and/or to private companies which will cooperate with CSOs. A major difference between the two models will however persist: important public funding granted to these actors in Europe, which is less the case in the Liberal model. The alternative of this sub-scenario will be a progressive transfer of national competencies regarding public services and public missions to a regional level (Bance, AUGUR 2012). In this case, the European model will stay closer to its historical model of a Welfare Partnership. The regional authority will supervise public services and public missions, but in order to adapt its policy to regional specificities it will cooperate with government funded CSOs for the definition, the implementation and the evaluation of its policies. A higher regional cooperation in Europe should also encourage the development of environmental and financial regulation concerns, where the old continent has often shown in the past that it was capable of taking important initiatives. It is thus likely that, in S3, the European group will witness a significant growth of the environmental and financial civil society sectors. These CSOs will gain influence on a regional level and will force Europe and its partners to adopt restrictive measures regarding greenhouse gas emission and financial regulation. The influence of these CSOs beyond the frontiers of the European group will nevertheless be very limited. In any case, CSOs will play an important role in this reinforced European integration towards federal Europe, be it in the definition of what will be this reinforced Europe (be it federal or not), in the field of institutional innovation or in the definition of European social and regional policies.

The Asian group will follow a very specific path. Following China, most of these countries will refocus on their domestic markets or intra-zone trade. Thus, a significant effort will be made to enhance domestic consumption. As in S1, CSOs will be at the core of this social transformation and a strong growth in the well-being & living conditions as well as in the civic and labor rights civil society sectors will thus be witnessed. As in S2, there will be some level of environmental movements however probably more focused on local issues (water pollution, air pollution in the cities, waste etc.) than global warming. It is likely that in several countries, especially China, such public environmental and social policies will be accompanied by influent CSOs (especially GONGOs) which will be needed for their specific skills.

In the rest of the world, the situation will be in between S1 and S2. The situation of Latin America and India will not change much compared to the S1 situation regarding CSOs. In lesser developed countries (including Sub-Saharan and low income Asian countries) where CSOs focus on poverty fighting and rely heavily on international aid, the situation will be better than in S1, but international solidarity will be less important than in S2 as developed countries will focus on intra-zone development. However, clientelism will be less important than in S2, even if this phenomenon will
persist at some level as the three major blocs will try to expand their influence. Major uncertainties remain regarding the Arabic world. The question here is whether social and civic movements of the Arabic Spring will persist in time and if these countries will achieve some regional integration.

As the focus will be on the regional level, there will be few global actions, especially regarding environmental, technological and financial issues. Despite the growth of environmental and financial CSOs on a regional level, it will be quite difficult for them to expand their regional influence to the global level as international multilateral cooperation will be relatively limited. As shown before, the three models of the major regional groups are very different including the weight, structure, financing and distribution of the civil society. In such a context, it will be very difficult for CSOs to cooperate at an international level and to force the three blocks to take common restrictive measures regarding global warming and financial regulation. The latter will be adopted on a regional level where consensus will be easier to reach but global major measures will be difficult to implement. Global civil actors, such as INGOs or CSO coalitions will of course have better opportunities to influence international institutions and TNCs than in S1. However, global actions and the actual implementation of global policies will always depend on whether a consensus between the major regional groups is reached or not, as each group will be reluctant to implement restrictive measures if the other regions do not follow.

D. The Multipolar Collaboration scenario

In this scenario, regional integration eventually leads to a global multilateral cooperation. Global financial regulation and imbalances, poverty fighting and global environmental issues are thus seriously treated at a global level.

The regional development of CSOs thus do not change much in S4 compared to S3 in the three blocs (US, European and Asian blocs). However, the situation changes dramatically for Latin America, India and lesser developed African countries. Indeed, it is in this scenario that important measures will be adopted to reach the MDGs. New, ambitious development goals will be introduced for the period after 2015 and there will be a real multipolar commitment to achieve these goals. CSOs, which have been historical partners of governments in the development & housing and well-being & living conditions fields, will be of course at the core of these multilateral policies, probably led by the UN and a reformed WB.

As social and environmental local issues will be taken into account, the need for public missions and public services, involving cooperation with CSOs, will be reaffirmed. CSOs will have a tremendous impact on these questions as they will cooperate with states and international institutions and have significant financial backups to implement concrete projects to tackle down poverty and local social issues. In particular, CSOs will be a major provider of social innovation at the micro level.

On a global level, S4 assumes that serious measures will be implemented to regulate global financial flux, trade and financial imbalances. This involves dramatic institutional reforms at a global level and important institutional innovation, to allow the emergence of a rather democratic and multilateral global governance system. We assume that such an evolution of the international governance
framework can only be achieved through a close cooperation between governments and CSOs which will produce important institutional innovation.

In the particular field of finance, this scenario suggests a significant growth of the financial civil society sector. In this scenario, the push of CSOs for the reformation of the IMF and the WTO in more democratic and multilateral organizations, including of course closer cooperation with the civil society, will be successful. In such a context, financial CSOs will be able to advocate in favor of a fairer finance to the service of the real economy. TNCs and business lobbies will thus lose influence on international organizations.

The development of environmental CSOs, especially in the three major blocs (Europe, North America and Eastern Asia), will be able to coordinate their actions at a global level and influence the global agenda regarding these issues. Restrictive international agreements and goals regarding environmental issues, including notably greenhouse gas emissions, energy supply and sustainable production, global warming, water supply and pollution, ground pollution and GMOs regulation will be signed. This, however, results in a reasonable growth in developed countries and consumption restrictions, especially in countries where the ecological footprint is very high (ex: the USA). This could lead to several popular reluctances. The role of CSOs will thus be the education of people through awareness campaigns and the accompaniment of the shift of values and paradigm.

There is, in this scenario, a non negligible risk of the raise of anti-ecological movements, including the raise of pro-growth/pro-consumption CSOs. Indeed, some may be frustrated by the limitation imposed by this new model and may defend the right of having a large car, consuming as much as they want etc. Climate skepticism, encouraged by some TNCs and business lobbies, especially the oil industry, may be strengthened by this new set of strong environmental measures. This scenario could thus be the one of a violent confrontation of influent pro-environment CSOs and raising pro-consumption CSOs.

This last scenario, which is the more optimistic one, allows a considerable boom of CSOs in terms of capacity, sustainability and impact, especially in the environmental and financial fields – even if some anti-ecological movement might emerge in developed countries, especially where the ecological footprint is high and where important efforts will have to be made. As global governance will become more democratic and multilateral, the highest achievement of the integration of CSOs in international institution is achieved in this scenario, where the functioning of some organizations such as the IMF or the WTO will be fundamentally transformed. CSOs are also very active in the development & housing, well-being & living conditions, civic, farmer and labor rights fields of intervention as significant efforts are made to reach the newly defined post-MDGs and achieve fairer global trade rules and regulations. This scenario depends nevertheless on the occurrence of radical transformations and a shift of paradigm. As CSOs are one of the major actors which can influence deep values and mentalities, their future is, to some extent, in their own hands.
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